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In 1978, the Internal Revenue Service proposed a revenue proce-
dure that established guidelines for determining whether certain
private schools discriminated against students on the basis of race.'
The procedure applied to two types of schools: those adjudicated to
be discriminatory and "reviewable schools," which are those
formed or expanded to avoid desegregated public schools.2 The
Service received over 120,000 written comments on the proposal
and conducted four days of hearings.3 Adverse public opinion and
congressional reaction were substantial,4 and in February, 1979, the
* B.A., Alfred University; J.D., M.L.&T., William & Mary.
1. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296
(1978), revised, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451 (1979) (corrected at 44 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (1979)).
2. A school "adjudicated to be discriminatory" means any school found to be
discriminatory by a final decision of a Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction; by final agency action of a Federal administrative agency in accord-
ance with the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. . . or by a final
agency action of a State administrative agency following an adjudication in
which the school was a party or otherwise had the opportunity to submit evi-
dence.
"Reviewable school" means a school formed or substantially expanded at or
about the time of public school desegregation in the community served by the
school, and having a student body whose percentage of minority students is less
than 20 percent of the percentage of the minority school age population in the
community served by the school.
Id. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. §§ 3.02-03).
3. See [1978] 233 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) G-6. The total number of letters received by the
Service and Congress was estimated to have exceeded 150,000. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS UPDATE 1 (Jan., 1979) [hereinafter cited as UPDATE].
4. The "vast majority" of the written comments were "severely critical." [1978] 233 DAILY
TAX. REP. (BNA) G-6. Two hundred and twenty Congressmen and 60 Senators submitted
written comments. Id.
The opposition at the December 5, 1978, hearings included 15 members of Congress and a
former Commissioner of the IRS, R.W. Thrower. IRS Plan to Penalize Schools That Discrimi-
nate Denounced, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978, § A, at 25, col. 1.
In 1978, Congressman Crane introduced a bill that would have prevented the Treasury from
implementing the procedure, or any other procedure with "substantially similar" rules, until
1981. H.R. 14250, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. (1978). Proscriptive legislation also was advocated
by Senator Hatch. S. 3537, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
Several concurrent resolutions were published, for example:
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Service published a revised proposal, which is scheduled to become
fully effective in 1980. 5 The new guidelines retained the original
procedure's classification scheme but narrowed the "reviewable
schools" category and phrased the language of compliance more
liberally. Under the new procedure, if the Service determines that
a school discriminates against a particular race, the school is denied
tax exempt status. The most important consequence of a denial is
that contributors to the school may not deduct donations; 7 in' addi-
tion, the school is required to pay income tax and to participate in
the federal social security and unemployment tax.programs.
In 1971, in Green v. Connally, I the District Court for the District
of Columbia held that private segregated schools do not qualify for
exempt status Also in 1971, the holding in Green was reflected in
Whereas the Internal Revenue Service has proposed new procedures for deter-
mining whether the Government believes certain private schools have racially
discriminatory policies for the purposes of determining whether to continue the
former tax-exempt status of those schools under the Internal Revenue Code.
Whereas the purpose of tax legislation and regulation should be to raise reve-
nue and not to coerce certain classes of individuals in society toward Govern-
ment ends; and
Whereas there is no rational nexus between the function of the Internal Reve-
nue Service to collect revenues and these punitive procedures; and
Whereas freedom of choice should remain intact for private groups and indi-
viduals in society; and
Whereas these procedures establish a dangerous trend toward arbitrary and
capricious Government action seriously endangering freedom of choice and
setting a precedent for tax coercion even as regards separate individuals; Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is
the sense of Congress that the Internal Revenue Service should not adopt the
"Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools" published on
page 37296 of the Federal Register of August 22, 1978.
H.R. Con. Res. 711, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); see, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 724, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978); H.R. Con. Res. 732, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
5. Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451
(1978) (corrected at 44 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (1978)).
6. Compare 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297-98 (Rev. Proc. § 4) with 44 Fed.. Reg. at 9,454 (Rev.
Proc. § 4). The new procedure covers only private elementary and secondary schools. Id. at
9,452 (Rev. Proc. § 2.05).
7. The reaction to the Service's proposal is an indication of the pecuniary importance of
tax exemptions to private schools. Deductability of contributions is a critical consideration
for major donors. Liability for income tax generally is not a concern for private schools
because most have little or no net income.
8. 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mer. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
9. The Service was enjoined from exempting from taxation private schools in Mississippi,
absent a showing of a nondiscriminatory policy as to students. Id. at 1179-80. The court
excluded certain sectarian schools from its holding. Id. at 1169.
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a revenue ruling which stated that private segregated schools were
ineligible for exemption under the charitable organization provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code.'" Since Revenue Ruling 71-447"1
was published, the Service has issued an additional ruling and two
procedures concerning private segregated schools.'" Many private
segregated schools are still tax exempt, 3 however, and the revised
procedure represents the culmination of over eight years of govern-
mental efforts to deny these schools the benefits of exemption.
Before and after 1971, the usual administrative difficulties en-
countered when the Service attempts to enforce unpopular laws
were compounded by constitutional issues posed by the first, 4
fifth," and fourteenth 6 amendments. Soon, arguments based on the
religion clauses and on the limitations imposed by the equal protec-
tion doctrine may have to be confronted. Two developments that
may force a resolution of the constitutional questions are pending
legislation restricting the Service's power to deny tax exemption"
and Bob Jones University v. United States,' in which an institution
that practices discrimination retained its tax exemption. After a
discussion of the statutory provisions, the constitutional issues, and
the administrative precursors to the Service's proposed procedure,
this Article examines the operation of the procedure and certain
,legal and policy questions. The conclusion of this analysis is that
fair administration of the procedure will result in a net benefit to
the communities involved.
INTERPRETATION OF THE CODE
The authority to exempt schools from income tax is found in
section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which refers to reli-
10. I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3).
11. 1971-2 C.B. 230.
12. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587; Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Proc. 72-54,
1972-2 C.B. 834 (superceded).
13. See Statement of Commissioner Kurtz before the House Ways & Means Oversight
Subcommittee (Feb. 20, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 36 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-1, J-2
[hereinafter cited as Kurtz Statement].
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1 (establishment and free exercise clauses).
15. Id. amend. V, cl. 3 (due process clause).
16. Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4 (equal protection clause).
17. See notes 229-32 infra.
18. [1979] FED. TAXES (P-H) (43 A.F.T.R.2d) 79-392 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 1979), appeal
authorized, [1979] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) 61,000.
1979]
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gious, charitable, and educational organizations. 9 Contributions to
exempt schools are deductible, up to certain limits, under section
170 of the Code.2 1 Section 3121(b)(8)(B) excludes from employment
subject to social security tax services performed for a section
501(c)(3) entity,2' and services rendered to a section 501(c) (3) organ-
ization are excluded from coverage under the federal unemployment
tax program by section 3306(c)(8). 22
Section 501(c) (3) is the critical provision in the statutory scheme.
Although the section classifies organizations operated exclusively
for educational purposes as exempt, the Service's position, set forth
in Revenue Ruling 71-447, is that the section applies only to entities
that qualify as common law charities. Schools are not exempt per
se; they also must be charitable.2 The correct construction of sec-
19. Entities exempt from taxation include "[c]orporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
The statutory scheme of I.R.C. §§ 170, 501(c)(3), and the problem of private segregated
schools are discussed in Spratt, Federal Tax Exemption for Private Segregated Schools: The
Crumbling Foundation, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, Federal Tax Benefits to
Segregated Private Schools, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 922 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Federal Tax];
Note, The Validity of Tax Benefits to Private Segregated Schools, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1410
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Tax Benefits]; Note, The Tax Exempt Status of Segregated
Schools, 24 TAX. L. REV. 409 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tax Exempt]; Note, Tax Exemp-
tions for Racial Discrimination in Education, 23 TAX. L. REV. 399 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Racial Discrimination]; Note, Constitutionality of Federal Tax Benefits to Private Segre-
gated Schools, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 289 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Segregated
Schools]; 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 179 (1970); 41 U. CiN. L. REV. 481 (1972).
20. Deductible charitable contributions include donations made to "[a] corporation,
trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific,- literary, or educational purposes." I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(B).
21. Employment for social security tax purposes excludes "service performed in the employ
of a religious, charitable, educational, or other organization described in section 501(c)(3)
which is exempt from income tax." I.R.C. § 3121(b)(8)(B).
22. I.R.C. § 3306(c)(8). The relevant language is identical to the social security exclusion.
See note 21 supra.
23. The issue is whether a private school that does not have a racially nondiscri-
minatory policy as to students is 'charitable' within the common law concepts
found in section 501(c)(3). . . . [Riacial discrimination in education is con-
trary to Federal public policy. Therefore, a school not having a racially nondis-
criminatory policy as to students is not 'charitable' within the common law
concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and in other relevant
Federal statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt
from Federal income tax.
Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 231.
The different positions that have been taken by the Service are discussed in UNITED STATES
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tion 501(c) (3) was commented on extensively during the years pre-
ceding the issuance of the 1971 ruling.24 Two interpretations that
would preclude exemption for segregated private schools were pos-
tulated, but their differences were indistinct; the Service adopted
the salient elements of both in 1971.
The statutory approach was that the sole purpose of the express
inclusion of educational and religious entities in section 501(c)(3)
was to illustrate some of the types of charities to which the section
applied. This reasoning led to the conclusion that a school must be
charitable to qualify for exemption.2 Although the law of charities
traditionally allowed for segregated schools, this view no longer was
considered valid because segregated schools did not benefit the com-
munity, the criterion by which charities were measured.2 1 Any bene-
fit to the students of a segregated school was outweighed by the
institution's adverse effect on society. 27 A variation of the statutory
approach assumed the independence of the term "educational"
from the charity concept.28 This literal construction focused on the
word "exclusively", which modifies "educational purposes, 29 and
required that education be a school's sole raison d'etre. Despite a
school's educational purpose, if the reason for its founding or expan-
sion was to perpetuate segregation, then this other purpose de-
stroyed its exemption."
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 3 THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974, To ENSURE
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 142-56 (1975) [hereinafter cited as EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY]; Johnson & Orleans, Nondiscrimination Doesn't Have to Not Work: Restricted
Scholarships, H.E.W., & I.R.S., 7 J.L. & EDUC. 493, 501-02 (1978); and Saunders, Bakke v.
Regents of University of California: Potential Implications for Income Tax Exemptions and
Affirmative Action in Private Educational Organizations, 11 U. CAL. D. L. REv. 1, 2-9 (1978).
24. Spratt, supra note 19; Federal Tax, supra note 19; Tax Benefits, supra note 19; Tax
Exempt, supra note 19; Racial Discrimination, supra note 19; 5 U. RICH. L. REv. 178 (1970).
25. See Spratt, supra note 19, at 9-24; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 942; Tax Benefits,
supra note 19, at 1422; Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 426; Racial Discrimination, supra
note 19, at 400.
26. See Spratt, supra note 19, at 19-20; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 943-45; Tax Exempt,
supra note 19, at 427-28. Even a conservative application of the law of charities to segregated
schools probably would have been "inconclusive", Tax Benefits, supra note 19, at 1423, or
"indecisive", Spratt, supra note 19, at 23, because the law was in flux.
27. See Spratt, supra note 19, at 19-20; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 945; Racial Discrimi-
nation, supra note 19, at 411. One discussion also noted that private segregated schools may
not be considered charitable because the relationship between the major contributors and the
beneficiaries was too close. Id. at 409-13.
28. Tax Exempt, supra note 17, at 424.
29. See notes 19-20 supra.
30. Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 424. If "exclusively" is not construed to require the
1979]
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The second theory of construction, the public policy approach,
was that exemption provisions should be construed consistently
with the policy against segregated education.3' Although technically
a segregated school might meet the exempt organization require-
ments, exemption should be denied if an important public policy
would be thwarted. The public policy approach was relied on Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 in which the Supreme Court
held that a truckline could not take a business expense deduction 33
for state fines imposed for violations of maximum load weight laws.
The holding in Tank Truck was limited by its own language34 and
other Court cases.3 5 In addition, the case involved a Code section
unrelated to the exempt organization provisions.3 6 Despite these dis-
absence of a detrimental purpose, such as segregation, then a literal reading of the Code and
regulations can support a contrary result. See 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1189 (1972). See also Tax
Exempt, supra note 19, at 427. Segregated schools are educational entites, and the regulations
define educational in its conventional sense: "instruction or training ... for the purpose of
improving or developing." Treas. Reg. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i)(a) (amended 1976, 1967, 1961).
The regulations include primary and secondary schools as examples of qualifying educational
organizations. Id. 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(ii), Example (1). "Thus it is clear segregated as well as
integrated schools are included within the applicable statues." 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. at 1190-
91.
As to the community benefit issue, a segregated school might be considered charitable if
only one question is answered affirmatively: "Do these institutions confer [any] benefit
upon society?" Id. at 1208. This approach does not allow for a balancing of educational benefit
to the students of the school against the countervailing adverse impact on society attributable
to the perpetuation of the prejudice underlying segregation; private segregated schools' net
contribution to society is negative.
31. Spratt, supra note 19, at 24; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 946; Tax Benefits, supra
note 19, at 1423; Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 429; Racial Discrimination, supra note 19,
at 403. A public policy construction was criticized as administratively impractical in 41 U.
CIN. L. REv. 481, 487 (1972). Another view is that public policy considerations mandate
exemption for segregated schools. 5 U. RICH. L. Rav. 178, 180-81 (1970).
32. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
33. I.R.C. § 162(a) permits deductions of ordinary and necessary business expenses from
income.
34. Justice Clark made a typical judicial qualification: "This is not to say that the rule as
to frustration of sharply defined national or state policies is to be viewed or applied in any
absolute sense." 356 U.S. at 35.
35. Two important cases are Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958), and Lilly v.
Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952). In Sullivan the Court allowed a bookmaker to deduct
ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in his illegal activity. Because the practice
was pervasive, the Court in Lilly permitted deduction of kickbacks to prescribing doctors in
the optical industry. Cf. Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (guilty criminal may
deduct defense costs as business expense in securities fraud prosecutions).
36. To the extent that § 501(c)(3) is a social provision and not an economic one, a public
policy construction is more appropriate than when the business expense provision is involved.
See Racial Discrimination, supra note 19, at 406. The Code is a repository of both social and
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tinctions, Tank Truck generally was believed to be a relevant pre-
cedent because it was based on the rationale that interpretation of
the Code should not conflict with declared public policy. 3
That public policy mandated integrated public schooling was
clear. Commentators relied on Brown v. Board of Education3 and
the Civil Rights Act of 196411 to extend this public policy to private
schools." The Service was hesitant" to deny exemptions however;
no case had disqualified a private segregated school under section
501(c)(3), and the Nixon Administration dictated a conservative
position.42 In 1971, the necessary judicial interpretation was made
in Green v. Connally, and the Service issued Revenue Ruling 71-447.
The public policy approach no longer needs to rely on analogies
with public schools because in 1976 the Supreme Court held that
secular private segregated schools violate the Civil Rights Act of
1866.13 Moreover, Runyon v. McCrary" undergirds a public policy
under Tank Truck.
economic interests, however, and distinctions based on social or economic purpose are in-
structive, rather than conclusive.
37. See Spratt, supra note 19, at 24-33; Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 429; Racial Discrimi-
nation, supra note 19, at 403-05. But see Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 946 n.125. Another
opinion was that reliance on Tank Truck was a "bizarre contortion. . .of business deduction
doctrine." 50 Tax. L. REv. 544, 552 (1972) (preferred rationale for disallowance is constitu-
tional).
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Warren Court held that intentional maintenance of segregated
public schools violated the equal protection clause.
39. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1964). A specific provision of Title VI might apply if
tax exempt status were considered a form of financial assistance: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); see EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUN-
rrY, supra note 23, at 146. Congress did not consider the consequences of this broad statement
on the Code. See Tax Benefits, supra note 19, at 1424-25. See generally Horvitz, Tax Subsi-
dies to Promote Affirmative Action in Admission Procedures for Institutions of Higher
Learning, 52 TAXEs 452, 462 (1974).
40. E.g., Spratt, supra note 19, at 29; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 946-49; Tax Benefits,
supra note 19, at 1423-25; Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 429-31.
41. See I.R.S. News Release, January 13, 1970, reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 6,352.
42. See Showell, The Courts, the Legislature, the Presidency, & School Desegregation
Policy, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, SHADOW & SUBSTANCE (1976); UNITED STATES COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, 7 THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-1974, To PRESERVE, PRO-
TECT, AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION 27-29 (1977); UNrrED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
REVIEWING A DECADE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-1975, at 14 (1977) (staff report).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
44. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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STATE AND FEDERAL ACTION
Until July, 1970, the Service's position was that otherwise quali-
fied private segregated schools could be denied exempt status only
if the school's operation was unconstitutional under the equal pro-
tection clause.4 - The clause does not operate in the absence of state
action, and until Green v. Connally, this requirement protected
schools that received no direct or indirect state aid from being de-
nied exemption." The resolution of Green was statutory; whether
state action exists without some form of affirmative governmental
assistance has not been decided.
Before 1970, the important cases involved invalidation of various
machinations used by states to give financial support to private
segregated schools. In Griffin v. State Board of Education," decided
in 1965, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia held that a state tuition assistance plan was unconstitutional
only if government authorities knew the state money would provide
45. The legality of state support for private segregated schools was unclear in the early
1960's, and the Service withheld approval of exemptions to these schools from 1965 to 1967.
See generally Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C.), appeals dismissed for
want of jurisdiction sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970); Colt v. Green, 400 U.S.
986 (1971). In 1967, the Service issued the following news release:
The Internal Revenue Service today announced that it has resumed ruling on
the tax exempt status of private, non-profit schools ....
Where, however, the school is private and does not have such degree of in-
volvement with the political subdivision as has been determined by the courts
to constitute State action for constitutional purposes, rulings will be issued
holding the school exempt and the contributions to it deductible assuming that
all other requirements of the statute are met.
I.R.S. New Release, August 2, 1967, reprinted in [1967] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
6,734.
The Service's position seemed to be inconsistent with a 1967 ruling that certain other
charitable entities would be denied exempt status if they discriminated, regardless of state
funding or participation. Rev. Rul. 67-325, 1967-2 C.B. 113. The Service distinguished the
purpose of the organization involved, which was provision of recreational facilities; this pur-
pose was not one traditionally associated with common law charities. Common law charities,
such as schools, could be for the benefit of only a part of the community, but "modern"
charities had to be for the benefit of the entire community. See Spratt, supra note 19, at 9-
24, for further discussion.
46. The state action problem is discussed in Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 927-35; Tax
Benefits, supra note 19, at 1426-38; Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 415-22; Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 19, at 413-17; Private Segregated Schools, supra note 19, at 294-300; 23
SYAcusE L. REV. 1189, 1205-07 (1972); and 50 TEx. L. REv. 544, 551-52 (1972).
47. 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965).
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the majority of the funding for a segregated school." The modem
view was expressed two years later by the Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana. In Poindexter v. Louisiana Finan-
cial Assistance Commission,49 which also involved state tuition
grants for private school children, the court held that any affirma-
tive and intentional state aid to private discrimination in education
violated the equal protection clause. Poindexter was important be-
cause, unlike Griffin, it rejected a state action test based on the
degree of support given to the school. 0 State action is a doctrine that
can be applied pragmatically, and under it fell several other funding
schemes; for example, transportation cost assistance programs' and
tax credits" that supported segregated schools also were held uncon-
stitutional.
Even absent some form of state financial largesse, at least three
theories might have supported application of the equal protection
clause to private segregated schools.53 A school's adherence to state
promulgated standards for educational facilities, curriculum, and
teacher certification might constitute state action. A finding of state
action might be based on the rationale that educational activities
are public functions that never can be completely private. Assuming
a state obligation to establish an integrated school system, state
action might be found in a state's failure to legislate against private
segregated schools. These rationales would have extended the state
action doctrine beyond its limits54 and, unrestricted, might have
made too many otherwise private activities susceptible to impracti-
48. "State grants may within certain limits still be paid for use in private schools although
they adhere to a policy of segregation. Our determination is simply that the preponderant
support of a segregated school may not be rooted in state action." Id. at 566.
49. 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affl'd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
50. The defendant in Poindexter tried to save the program by limiting aid so that schools
would not be maintained predominantly by state tuition grants. But the court stated,
"[W]e disagree with the criterion the Court applied in Griffin. The payment of public funds
in any amount through a state commission under authority of a state law is undeniably state
action." Id. at 854.
51. Pettaway v. County School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1964).
52. Allen v. County School Bd., 198 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1961).
53. The ideas in this paragraph also are expressed in Tax Exempt, supra note 19, at 416-
18; and Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).
54. The Court has refused to increase the state action doctrine's ambit. See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972). More recently, in a due process case, the Court found no state action in a warehouse-
man's statutory sale of goods for which storage charges were due. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978).
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cal constitutional restraints. For this reason, and because judges
avoid constitutional decisions when statutory answers are available,
the courts have not adopted these theories.
No express equal protection language restricts the federal govern-
ment, but if tax exempt status itself constituted "state" action,
then the grant of exemptions to private segregated schools would be
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.55 In Boiling v. Sharpe,5" the Supreme Court held that the
operation of segregated public schools in Washington, D.C., de-
prived black students of their liberty under the due process clause.
Section 501(c)(3) status is as much a subsidy of charitable activi-
ties 5 7 as the more direct assistance forbidden in Poindexter1 and its
progeny; distinctions based on act and omission analysis cavil.59
The Code is distinguishable from the various unconstitutional
55. The district court relied on this rationale in Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127
(D.D.C.), appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956
(1970), and Coit v. Green; 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
56. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Bolling was decided concurrently with Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
57. Horvitz, supra note 39, at 455; Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 927; Racial Discrimina-
tion, supra note 19, at 415; Private Segregated Schools, supra note 19, at 300-02; 50 TEX.
L. REv. 544, 551 (1972). But see 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1189, 1205 (1972).
58. Although the court in Poindexter distinguished impermissible state aid from "tax
benefits, free school books, and other products of the State's traditional policy of benevolence
toward charitable and educational institutions," 275 F. Supp. at 854, this language is dicta
which has been rejected in part by the Supreme Court. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455
(1973) (textbooks).
59. Congressman Dornan, in a long argument, has contended otherwise. Relying on Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHouLD NOT PAY TAXES
(1977), Dornan wrote that:
[Ilt is of utmost importance to stress the operational distinctions between a
tax exemption and a subsidy: First, in a tax exemption, no money changes
hands between Government and the organization; second, a tax exemption, in
and of itself, does not provide one cent to an organization; without contributions
from its supporters, it has nothing to spend. . . . [Tihe amount of a subsidy
is determined by a legislature or an administrator; there is no amount involved
in a tax exemption because it is open-ended; the organization's income is depen-
dent solely on the generosity of its several contributors . . . . [A] subsidy is
not voluntary. . . . When the legislature taxes the citizenry and appropriates
a portion of the revenues as a subsidy to an organization, the individual citizen
has nothing determinative to say as to the amount of the subsidy or the selection
of the recipient . . . . [A] tax exemption does not convert the organization
into an agency of State action, whereas a subsidy-in certain circumstances-
may.
125 CONG. REC. E802-03 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (extension of remarks) (citation omitted).
See also note 71 infra.
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state plans in that the Code's operation was not intended to
propagate segregated schools, but legitimate purpose does not
justify discriminatory impact. 0 Moreover, forbidden state action
can be found despite facial neutrality; the neutrality of various
state plans did not shield them from rigorous judicial scrutiny and
holdings of constitutional infirmity.6' The unconstitutionality of the
provisions as applied to private segregated schools has been advo-
cated frequently," but neither the courts nor the Service have
adopted the position that application of the Code constitutes state
action proscribed by Boiling.3
CHURCH-RELATED SCHOOLS
When private schools affiliated with or administered by churches
practice discrimination, attempts to require desegregation or deny
tax exempt status raise the issue whether those efforts unconstitu-
tionally impinge on the free exercise or establishment clauses of the
first amendment.64 At least since 1970, the Service has not distin-
60. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
61. E.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
62. See Federal Tax, supra note 19; Tax Exempt, supra note 19; Racial Discrimination,
supra note 19; Note, Segregation Academies & State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973); 40 TEX.
L. REv. 544 (1972).
63. A problem foreseen in expanding the scope of state action to include tax exemption is
that the expansion would be too broad. 23 SYaAcusE L. Rav. 1189, 1206 (1972); 41 U. CIN. L.
Rv. 481, 487 (1972).
Professor Bittker noted the problem in the context of a court denial of tax exempt status
to a private club that refused membership to nonwhites. In an article that examined McGlot-
ten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972), he concluded, "Even when the restrictions
are invidious, a governmental program to discover and eradicate them necessarily imposes
social costs; a society that tries to punish every instance of man's inhumanity to man may
lose its humanity while crusading against the enemy." Bittker & Kaufman, Taxes & Civil
Rights: "Constitutionalizing" the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51, 86 (1972).
64. "The argument of violation of the First Amendment. . . is that denial of qualification
constitutes an impermissible burden upon the free exercise of religious beliefs and/or that the
denial of qualification upon opposing religious beliefs that do not require such discrimination
constitutes a prohibited establishment of those opposing beliefs." Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 (E.D.N.C. J1977).
The imbroglio of permissible church-state relations is beyond the scope of this Article.
Representative of the diversity in this complex area of the law are Public Funds for Pub.
Schools of New Jersey v. Byrne, 47 U.S.L.W. 2474 (3d Cir. 1979), and Minnesota Civil
Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). In Byrne the circuit court
held unconstitutional New Jersey's $1,000 tax deduction for parents of children in private
schools. In Roemer the district court upheld against constitutional challenges a tax deduction
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guished church-related schools from others,65 and Revenue Ruling
75-2311" formally rejected exemption of segregated schools even in
those instances in which the tenets of the religion required exclusion
of certain groups. Rationales that might justify encroachment on
the first amendment could be based on the distinction between the
belief in segregation and the practice of segregation, 7 the secular
for costs actually incurred by parents of private school students, up to $700. Both schemes
were challenged because the deduction was available to parents who sent their children to
church-related schools. The facts of the cases can be distinguished, but the relevant issue,
indirect subsidization of schools affiliated with churches, was the same in both instances.
The Supreme Court recently considered state aid to church-related schools in Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and in a plurality opinion permitted state provision of textbooks,
testing and scoring services, and diagnostic, therapeutic and remedial services. The Court,
however, disallowed field trip assistance and provision of certain instructional materials and
equipment by the state. The Supreme Court cases are reviewed in Blanton, The Entangle-
ment Theory: Its Development and Some Implications for Future Aid to Church-Related
Higher Education, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 359 (1978). Blanton notes Wolman, and the case also is
the subject of a comment. 24 N.Y.L.S.L. REv. 545 (1978).
The church-state debate is interminable. One extreme is that
[t]his entire network of special favoritism for religious activities is no more or
less than an unconstitutional establishment of religion, in contravention of the
dictates of the First Amendment. The tax preference is granted to churches
because of a government decision that religious activity is beneficial and is to
be encouraged, which is a decision that is not open to the government to make.
Delibert, Should Churches be Taxed?, 3 UPDATE 16, 16 (1979). The contrary view is that
[f]or so long as Federal income taxes have had any potential impact on
churches-over 75 years-religious organizations have been expressly exempt
from the tax. Few concepts are more deeply imbedded in the fabric of our
national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than for the Gov-
ernment to exercise at the very least this kind of benevolent neutrality toward
churches and religious exercise generally, so long as none was favored over others
and none suffered interference.
125 CONG. REC. E801 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (extension of remarks of Rep. Doran).
65. In one of a series of announcements that followed Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp.
1127 (D.D.C.), appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S.
956 (1970), and Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971), the Service noted it would make no
distinction between church-related and secular schools. I.R.S. News Release, July 19, 1979,
reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 6,814. The Chief Counsel for the IRS
reiterated this policy in a 1978 speech: "Racial discrimination in private education is no more
permissible from the standpoint of tax exemption when practiced under the auspices of a
church than it is in a secular setting." Remarks of Stuart E. Siegal, Chief Counsel for IRS,
on Proposed Procedure on Tax Exempt Private Schools, at Stoney Brook Tax Institute (Oct.
26, 1978), reprinted in [1978] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) 55,560 [hereinafter cited as Siegal].
66. 1975-1 C.B. 158. This ruling denies exempt status to virtually every variation of belief
and corporate form that church-affiliated or church-administered schools might take. Schools
may discriminate on the basis of religion, however, if admission to the religious denomination
is open. Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
67. See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158, 159.
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nature of the educational process,8 and the countervailing interest
of minorities to be treated equally. 9 The Service relied on several
decisions in its ruling, but the administrators anticipated the
case law."0 The Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
church exemption from state property taxes in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission of the City of New York," and held that the establishment
clause was not violated. Walz answered the religion question in a
limited context,7 2 and Green v. Connally avoided the problem. 73 No
court reached the issue until 1977.
In Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 74 the Fed-
eral District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina held
that denial of section 501(c)(3) treatment to a church-related pri-
vate segregated school was consistent with first amendment guaran-
tees. The relationship between the church and the school was close;
the church was instrumental in the school's establishment, and it
donated physical facilities and employee services to the school with-
out cost. All classes began with prayers, and a Bible related course
was required for all students each semester. The school contended
68. See generally Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 940 n.96.
69. See generally 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1629, 1640-42 (1973).
70. In addition to circuit court cases, the Service cited two Supreme Court decisions that
involved the nineteenth century conflict between the Mormon Church and the federal govern-
ment, Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); and Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1879).
71. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Chief Justice Burger noted that the grant of tax exempt status to
a church operates an an indirect economic benefit, but he emphasized that the grant was not
equivalent to "sponsorship" or excessive government entanglement. Id. at 674-76.
The determination that a tax exemption does not involve church-state contact sufficient
to violate the establishment clause could be extended to support the proposition that tax
exemptions are not equivalent to the state action necessary to activate the fifth amendment.
See Tax Benefits, supra note 19, at 1425 n.93; 23 SYRACUSE L. Rlv. 1189, 1203-04 (1972). But
see Horvitz, supra note 39, at 456; 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 179, 185-86 (1970); 19 WAYNE L.
REV. 1629, 1639 (1973).
72. The impact of Walz is discussed in Tax Benefits, supra note 19, at 1427-30. Walz was
rejected as not controlling in Green. 330 F. Supp. at 1168-69.
73. 330 F. Supp. at 1169. But cf. id. at 1163.
74. 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C. 1977). The school had never been determined to be
exempt, and the court held the school liable for federal social security and unemployment
taxes. In addition to the exemption issue, the case involved the question of whether housing
provided to teachers by the school should be treated as income. This issue also was resolved
in the government's favor. The district court later reconsidered the question of the correct
treatment of housing provided to the teachers -and again held for the government. Goldsboro
Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, [1979] FED. TAXES (P-H) (43 A.F.T.R.2d) 79-473
(E.D.N.C. 1978).
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that its interpretation of the Bible required exclusion of non-
caucasions, and the court assumed the school's discriminatory ad-
missions policy was based on its religious beliefs. In deciding against
the school, however, the court emphasized that the denial of the
exemption was for a secular reason and noted that the effect of the
denial was neutral because it neither enhanced nor inhibited reli-
gion.75
Goldsboro was overshadowed by a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
case in which an injunction and damages were awarded black plain-
tiffs who were denied admission to a church-related school. In
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc.,7 also decided in 1977, the
court held that if a school's discriminatory admissions policy is not
the exercise of religion, under Runyon v. McCrary, the policy vio-
lates the Civil Rights Act of 1866.17 The record was ambiguous on
the exercise of religion question; 7 nevertheless, the circuit court
affirmed the trial court's finding that the admissions policy was
based on "social policy or philosophy" rather than on religious man-
date.79 Therefore, the appellate court did not reach the first amend-
ment issues. Despite Dade Christian's failure to consider the con-
flict between the Civil Rights Act and the religion clauses, the case
is important because it puts a heavy burden on a school to show that
segregation is part of its exercise of religion and because the ques-
75. The court relied on Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, rehearing denied sub nom.
Negre v. Larsen, 402 U.S. 934 (1971), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The court
also noted the Green dicta, 330 F. Supp. at 1169, that the state interest in desegregation
controls any private religious interest in segregation. 436 F. Supp. at 1319-20.
76. 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). The plaintiffs were a
black couple and their children. After arrival at the school with intent to apply for her
children's admission, Mrs. Brown was given a card on which was explained the school's policy
of "non-integration". Id. at 311.
77. Dade Christian's policy violated the right to contract codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1970). Dade Christian held no more than was decided in Runyon v. McCrary, in which
Justice Stewart, in holding the discrimination illegal, limited his opinion to "whether § 1981
prohibits private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to
prospective students because they are Negroes, and, if so, whether that federal law is constitu-
tional as so applied." 427 U.S. at 168. Dade Christian's significance lies in its failure to find
that the discrimination in question was the exercise of religion.
78. Circuit Judge Goldberg concurred, but disagreed with the finding that the discrimina-
tory policy was not the exercise of religion. 556 F.2d at 314-24. He wanted to decide the
constitutional question and argued that the free exercise clause was not violated: "[T]he
rights of blacks to participate in our society on equal terms must have ascendancy over a
religious practice that can be subordinated without impairing the religion's viability." Id. at
315.
79. Id. at 311.
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tion decided was not simply eligibility for exemption under the Code
but the illegality of the discriminatory admissions policy."
The most recent decision involved Bob Jones University, which
has been in litigation concerning its tax status since 1970.8' In 1979,
after several procedural decisions," the Federal District Court for
the District of South Carolina reached the merits. In Bob Jones
University v. United States, 3 the district court judge found that the
university was a religious organization and held that the Service's
denial of exempt status violated the school's first amendment
rights. Bob Jones University was unusual because of its strict reli-
gious practices and because it received no state or federal aid, direct
or indirect. The belief that interracial courtship and marriage vio-
lated express Biblical proscriptions was fundamental to the school's
religion; however, the university would admit blacks under certain
conditions. Admission and retention of all students was conditional
on their refraining from interracial courtship or interracial mar-
riage; students also were prohibited from advocating interracial
courtship or marriage, or joining organizations that advocated these
forbidden acts. 4 In finding that the university was a distinct reli-
80. See note 77 supra. Dade Christian stimulated substantial commentary. Note, Racial
Discrimination in Church Schools, 38 LA. L. REV. 874 (1978); Note, A Sectarian School
Asserts its Religious Beliefs: Have the Courts Narrowed the Constitutional Right to Free
Exercise of Religion?, 32 U. MuiLi L. RFv. 709 (1978); 91 HARv. L. REV. 879 (1978); 29 MERCER
L. REv. 1099 (1978).
81. See Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277 (D.S.C. 1971), rev'd, 472 F.2d
903, rehearing denied, 476 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1973), aff'd sub nom. Bob Jones University v.
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
82. The Supreme Court relied on I.R.C. § 74-21(a) and held that the Service could not
be enjoined from revoking Bob Jones University's exemption. Bob Jones University v.
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974).
83. [1979] FED. TAxEs (P-H) (43 A.F.T.R.2d) 79-392 (D.S.C. Jan. 11, 1979), appeal
authorized, [1979] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) 61,000. The university sued for the refund of twenty-
one dollars of federal unemployment taxes paid solely for jurisdictional purposes.
84. The Service contended there was no substantive difference between these rules and an
unqualified denial of admission to blacks. Id. at 79-591. The applicable disciplinary rules
were:
There is to be no interacial dating.
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization
which holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students wh6 espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the Univer-
sity's dating rules and regulations will be expelled.
Id. at 79-589 to -590.
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gious entity, the court emphasized that Bob Jones University was
not affiliated with any church, and detailed the pervasive influence
of the school's religious beliefs on virtually every aspect of academic
and social life."
The court conceded that substantial authority supports the exist-
ence of a public policy against segregated educational entities, but
concluded that there is no "clearly declared federal public policy
against the practice of racial discrimination by religious organiza-
tions.""8 The court insisted that a compelling state interest, neces-
sary to justify impingement on the religion clauses, was absent.87
Bob Jones University distinguished Goldsboro by noting that the
Goldsboro Christian Schools denied admission to blacks under any
circumstances and by emphasizing that the compelling secular in-
terest in Goldsboro, equal access to educational institutions, was
not present." The court repudiated the statutory and public policy
approaches as improper constructions of the Code. 9 Although the
holding and dicta in Bob Jones University are not delineated pre-
cisely,90 even a narrow reading brings the case into conflict with the
principle expressed in Goldsboro and the Service's policy towards
religious organizations. The government is appealing the district
court's decision,9' and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals can re-
solve this division of authority, because it also is the circuit in which
Goldsboro was decided.
85. Id. at 79-588 to -590.
86. Id. at 79-591.
87. Id. at 79-593. The court cited Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), for the compel-
ling interest test. In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist successfully challenged a denial of
state unemployment benefits because she refused to work on Saturdays. The district court
also believed its decision was consistent with the Supreme Court's emphasis in Walz on the
neutrality of the property tax exemption. 43 A.F.T.R.2d at 79-594.
88. 43 A.F.T.R.2d at 79-593.
89. Id. at 79-595 to -600. The court believed Green and Goldsboro incorrectly applied Tank
Truck. Id. at 79-596. The court noted the idea that the net effect of a segregated school on a
community is actually a detriment rather than a benefit, but dismissed the concept as a non
sequitur. Id. at 79-597 n.8. In effect, the court refused to try to balance whatever benefits may
be generated by private segregated schools against their adverse impact on society.
90. The court considered many of the issues. It stated that a finding that Bob Jones
University was a school would not change the result. Although certain violations of either
clause are grounds for unconstitutionality, the court discussed both the free exercise and the
establishment clauses. The court resolved the case on constitutional grounds, but also re-
jected the statutory and public policy approaches advocated by the Service.
91. Appeal to the Fourth Circuit was authorized. [1979] 9 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 61,000.
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GREEN V. CONNALLY AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE PROGENY
In 1970, the District Court for the District of Columbia granted a
preliminary injunction to black taxpayers and their children, which
restricted the Service's power to determine the exempt status of
private Mississippi schools." The Service could act only after af-
firmatively finding, in a manner approved by the district court, that
the "school is not a part of a system of private schools operated on
a racially segregated basis as an alternative to white students seek-
ing to avoid desegregated public schools."93 The rationale of Green
v. Kennedy 4 was constitutional: the court believed that allowing
deductions for contributions to private segregated schools under
section 170 provided significant federal support in derogation of the
due process clause. 5
In 1971, the district court issued a permanent injunction and
expanded the scope of its holding to "all private schools practicing
racial discrimination"96 in Mississippi. Green v. Connally adopted
a public policy construction of sections 170 and 501(c)(3),7 and
92. The Green cases were discussed extensively. Tax Benefits, supra note 19; Private Segre-
gated Schools, supra note 19; 6 HAav. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 179 (1970); 24 Sw. L.J. 705 (1970);
23 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1189 (1972); 50 TEx. L. Rxv. 544 (1972); 41 U. CiN. L. Ray. 481 (1972).
93. 309 F. Supp. at 1140. The plaintiffs in Green submitted the evidentiary record from
Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969), to the court. Relying
primarily on that record, the court in Green found that "segregated private schools have been
established in Mississippi for the purpose of avoiding the result of a unitary, non-racial public
school system required by the Federal court decisions outlawing segregation in public schools,
and in an attempt to maintain a broad pattern of racial segregation in the school system."
309 F. Supp. at 1134. In Coffey the court found that 48 private schools of the 49 in which
students received state tuition assistance had exclusively white enrollments; the remaining
school had only black students. This tuition aid scheme was held unconstitutional.
94. 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C.), appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Can-
non v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970), and Coit v. Green, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
95. The court found that benefits of tax exemption are "a substantial and significant
support by the government to the segregated private school pattern." Id. at 1134. The court
cited Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and stated, "The due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment does not permit the Federal Government to act in aid of private racial discrimi-
nation in a way which would be prohibited to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
309 F. Supp. at 1136.
96. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1164 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v.
Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). "It is no longer decisive whether the system is operated as an
alternative to white students seeking to avoid desegregated public schools." Id. at 1171-72 n.
43.
97. The Internal Revenue Code provisions on charitable exemptions and deduc-
tions must be construed to avoid frustrations of Federal policy. Under conditions
of today they can no longer be construed so as to provide to private schools
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expressly avoided the state action theory articulated in Green v.
Kennedy."5 The court relied on the thirteenth amendment, Brown
v. Board of Education, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as manifes-
tations of a federal public policy against racial discriminaton in
public and private education.9 Whether racial restrictions required
by religious beliefs were permissible was not presented and therefore
was not decided. 00
Before Green was resolved, the Service changed its position on the
state action requirement and announced it would no longer exempt
any schools that discriminated.' Green was affirmed summarily by
the Supreme Court.0 2 The significance of this affirmance was weak-
ened, however, when the Court, in 1974, stated that the Service's
shift of position lessened the weight the affirmance otherwise would
have been accorded. 103 Despite this dictum, the Service has relied
on Green's requirements for Mississippi schools to formulate proce-
operating on a racially discriminatory premise the support of the exemptions
and deductions which Federal tax law affords to charitable organizations and
their sponsors.
Id. at 1164.
98. The court indicated it would have held, if necessary, that the charitable provisions were
unconstitutional as applied, id. at 1171, but a statutory decision "obviated" the need to
resolve the state action question. Id. at 1164-65. The court did meet the issue whether the
constitutional freedom of association was invalidly impinged on by a public policy construc-
tion of the Code. Because the freedom does not mandate government support, id. at 1166,
and because the conflicting governmental interest in integration is compelling, id. at 1167,
the court rejected the impingement argument.
99. Although the court's decision was based on a compelling national public policy con-
struction of the Code, the court also examined the law of charitable trusts and stated that
reliance on a statutory approach also probably would result in disqualification of segregated
schools. Id. at 1157-61.
100. In dicta, later quoted in Goldsboro, 436 F. Supp. at 1319, the court stated that racial
segregation based on divine inspiration was inconsistent with public policy. 330 F. Supp. at
1163. The court failed to extend its holding to segregation mandated by religion, but Green
implied that religion may not shield discrimination. Id. at 1169 (citing Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890)).
101. "The Internal Revenue Service announced today that it has been concluded it can no
longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status to private schools which practice racial
discrimination nor can it treat gifts to such schools as charitable deductions for income tax
purposes." I.R.S. News Release, July 10, 1970, reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAx REp.
(CCH) 6,790. The Service's pre-1970 policy is commented on at note 45 supra. The Service
adhered to the state action requirement as late as January, 1970. See I.R.S. News Release,
January 13, 1970, reprinted in [1970] 7 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) ' 6,352.
102. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
103. This occurred in the case in which the Court denied Bob Jones University standing
to challenge the Service's denial of exempt status. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725,
740 n.11 (1974).
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dures and tests that all schools seeking exempt status must meet.
Green noted that the Service had authority to impose requirements
on schools throughout the country, 04 and stated, "[T]he court is
not to be misunderstood as laying down a special rule for schools
located in Mississippi. The underlying principle is broader, and is
applicable to schools outside Mississippi with the same or similar
badge of doubt."' Although the Service had published publicity
guidelines to implement its new policy,' Green identified inade-
quacies in the Service's administration of the charitable organiza-
tion provisions. 07 Green established a "nondiscriminatory policy as
to students" as a prerequisite to exemption for Mississippi schools,
and defined the term as meaning that
the school ... admits the students of any race to all the rights,
privileges, programs and activities generally accorded or made
available to students at that school, and which includes, specifi-
cally but not exclusively, a policy of making no discrimination on
the basis of race in administration of educational policies, appli-
cations for admission, of scholarship and loan programs, and ath-
letic and extra-curricular programs."'
Substantially identical language was incorporated in Revenue
Ruling 71-447.0 In that ruling, the Service adopted only the princi-
ple of Green, but in the next year the Service published Revenue
Procedure 72-54,"' which contained publicity guidelines based on
requirements made in Green."' Revenue Procedure 72-54 explained
how a school, which otherwise had not established that it has a
104. 330 F. Supp. at 1176.
105. Id. at 1174.
106. Pertinent portions of the Service's manual are reproduced in Green. Id. at 1172 n.45,
1175 n.51.
107. The court believed the Service's reliance on schools' good faith declarations of nondis-
criminatory policy was misplaced and gave examples of schools that continued to discrimi-
nate, although in technical compliance with the Service's publicity requirements. Id. at 1173-
76. The court stated, "There was no requirement by the IRS concerning these policy state-
ments, either as to frequency of publication, of form, or even, and significantly, whether the
publication was in a newspaper or over a radio station likely to be read by or listened to by
the Negro community." Id. at 1174.
108. Id. at 1179.
109. The language apparently came first from an IRS manual, published before Green was
decided. See id. at 1172 n.45.
110. 1972-2 C.B. 834, superceded, Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587. Pertinent portions of
the precursor to Rev. Proc. 72-54 are quoted in Green. 330 F. Supp. at 1175 n.51.
111. 330 F. Supp. at 1179.
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nondiscriminatory policy, could obtain exempt status."' The proce-
dure outlined four ways in which a school could satisfy the Service
that the school had adequately publicized to the community it
served that it was administering in good faith a racially nondiscri-
minatory policy."' Because the procedure was not universally appl-
icable, and because frequently compliance was only technical, the
procedure was ineffective."' In 1975, a procedure with more rigorous
standards was promulgated."'
The old procedure was superceded by Revenue Procedure 75-50,"e
which is still in force. It is applicable to all schools, and failure to
comply can result in revocation of exempt status. The procedure
contains record-keeping requirements and publicity guidelines a
school must follow to show "affirmatively both that it has adopted
a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students that is made
known to the general public and that since the adoption of that
policy it has operated in a bona fide manner in accordance there-
with."" 7 The procedure generally conforms to the mandate imposed
112. Rev. Proc. 72-54 was applicable, and now Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, is applica-
ble, to schools initially requesting exemption and to schools that previously have obtained
an exemption.
113. The examples provided for dissemination of the policy to all races of the community
served by the school in conventional print and broadcast media. Also acceptable was publica-
tion of the policy in brochures and catalogues, if they were distributed throughout the com-
munity. In addition, compliance could be by communication to the minority community
through its leaders.
114. The Service phrased the problem delicately in the introduction to the procedure that
superceded Rev. Proc. 72-54: "Internal Revenue Service experience with private schools has
shown a need for more specific guidelines to insure a uniform approach to the determination
of whether a private school has a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students." Rev. Proc.
75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 587. In 1975, the Civil Rights Commission found fault with the
Service's failure to adopt more stringent requirements than those in Rev. Proc. 72-54.
EDUCATIONAL OPPoRruNrry, supra note 23, at 161-67.
115. In a 1974 article critical of affirmative action requirements in higher education, the
author speculated that the Service encroached on the legislative prerogative in promulgating
Rev. Proc. 72-54. Horvitz, supra note 39, at 462. He commented:
The social utility of having the IRS tax segregation as practiced by . . .
institutions of higher learning through the execution of Rev. Proc. 72-54 by
having these institutions adopt admissions procedures based upon considera-
tions of race is a social experiment which will be sustained as antithetical to the
plurastic ideal that every individual should be afforded an equal opportunity
to higher education.
Id. at 464. Compare this observation with the Civil Rights Commission's 1975 criticism that
the Service's efforts were inadequate, EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 23, at 161-67.
116. 1975-2 C.B. 587.
117. Id.
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on Mississippi schools by Green:m  statements of nondiscriminatory
policy must be made in all brochures, catalogues, and advertise-
ments;"9 the policy must be disseminated by print or broadcast
media in a manner that will reach the minority population;, ° racial
composition of students, faculty, staff, and scholarship awards must
be recorded' and submitted' to the Service; and the school must
identify its promoters and contributors.12 The publicity require-
ment cannot be satisfied by dissemination of policy through minor-
ity community leaders. 24 Exception from the publicity requirement
is made for certain religious schools; 12 schools composed of students
from a regional, national, or international area; and certain schools
with a substantial minority enrollment. 21
In summary, three administrative declarations are available to
apply to schools desiring tax exempt status: Revenue Ruling 71-
447 states the general policy; Revenue Procedure 75-231 requires
nondiscriminatory policies in church-related schools; and Revenue
Procedure 75-50 mandates certain publicity and record-keeping re-
quirements.
118. In addition to the requirements articulated in Green, the Service requires schools to
incorporate statements of nondiscriminatory policy in bylaws, charters, and other governing
instruments. Id. The procedure exempts affirmative action programs from classification as
discriminatory. Id. at 587, 589. Religious-based discrimination is accorded no special treat-
ment, however. See note 66 supra. The procedure also allows for financial aid programs
"favoring members of one or more racial groups that do not significantly derogate from the
school's racially nondiscriminatory policy." 1975-2 C.B. at 589. This provision is criticized in
Johnson & Orleans, supra note 23, because the language allows scholarships restricted to
whites. A justification for this provision is that the use of funds, the distribution of which is
restricted to whites, frees additional money for financial aid to minorities which otherwise
would have to be allocated among all races.
119. 1975-2 C.B. at 588.
120. Id. at 588-89.
121. Id. at 589. With certain exceptions, records must be kept for three years.
122. Id. at 589-90. Data must be submitted with applications for exemption, and when
requested by the Service. The procedure also requires that each year a responsible school
official certify that the school has complied with the procedure.
123. In its application for exemption, a school must identify its "incorporators, founders,
board members, and donors of land or buildings." Id. at 589. The procedure also provides for
disclosure of the identity of organizations that support the school, and also promote segre-
gated education. Id.
124. Id. at 588. This was acceptable under Rev. Proc. 72-54. See note 113 supra.
125. See note 66 supra.
126. 1975-2 C.B. at 588-89. Exemption from the publicity requirement because of substan-
tial minority enrollment requires the school to show that it "enrolls students of racial minority
groups in meaningful numbers. [This is] determined on the basis of the facts and circum-
stances of each case." Id. at 589. This exemption impliedly is in consideration of communities
in which "relatively few or no" minority students live. Id.
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Norwood v. Harrison
In addition to Green v. Connally, the rationale of Norwood v.
Harrison2 7 is fundamental to the Service's proposed revenue proce-
dure. In Norwood, black plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Mississippi
State Textbook Purchasing Board from lending books to children
who attended private segregated schools."' In 1972, the Federal Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Mississippii dismissed the
complaint;2 9 the court perceived no constitutional flaw in the
scheme because the textbook loan program had a benign purpose
and because it was administered neutrally.' The Supreme Court
reversed, and held that any significant state support to private seg-
regated schools could not withstand fourteenth amendment scru-
tiny, regardless of the legislation's innocent purpose. 3 , The statute
invalidated in Norwood was passed in 1940, before integration
threatened the status quo in Mississippi, but this fact was not con-
trolling.
The Supreme Court suggested that the district court implement
a remedy involving private school certification of nondiscriminatory
admission policies to the state textbook board as a prerequisite to
obtaining books. The certification was to include the number of the
schools' racial and religious minority students and such other rele-
vant data as the court deemed necessary. 32 The district court
127. 382 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
128. Norwood was a class action brought by black school children.
129. 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), rev'd, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
130. The district court cited Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing
Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941), and Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In Chance the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the textbook
loan program against a challenge that it violated the state's constitutional proscription of
state aid to sectarian schools. Allen sustained the constitutionality of a New York statutory
scheme that provided for loans of textbooks to children attending private church-related
schools.
In the reversal of the district court, Chief Justice Burger stated that the district court's
characterization of the program as aid to students rather than to schools was inaccurate. 413
U.S. at 464, 465 & n.7. He also noted that reliance on cases permitting some forms of aid to
church-related schools was misplaced: "The leeway for indirect aid to sectarian schools has
no place in defining the permissible scope of state aid to private racially discriminatory
schools." Id. at 465 n.7; see id. at 469-70.
131. 413 U.S. at 466-67.
132. Id. at 471.
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implemented a certification plan,133 and in 1974, it reviewed chal-
lenges to the board's determinations of nondiscrimination. 13 In that
review, the district court articulated the elements of a prima facie
showing of discrimination: "[T]hat the school's existence began
close upon the heels of the masiive desegregation of public schools
within its locale, and. . . that no blacks are or have been in atten-
dance as students and none is or has ever been employed as teacher
or administrator at the private school. 135
A school against which a prima facie showing was made had to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that it did not have a ra-
cially discriminatory admissions policy. The district court ex-
plained that a school could satisfy its burden of proof by a showing
of active and vigorous recruitment programs to secure black stu-
dents or teachers, including student grants-in-aid, proof of con-
tinued, meaningful public advertisements stressing the school's
open admissions policy, proof of communication to black groups
and leaders within the community of the school's nondiscrimi-
natory practices, and similar evidence calculated to convince one
that the doors of the private school are indeed open to students
of both the black and white races upon the same standards of
admission.'36
Norwood involved textbooks, but the case is nevertheless relevant
to the tax exemption question, and although the district court dis-
cussed nondiscriminatory admissions, the elements of proof are
133. Schools were required to submit detailed information about their establishment, fund-
ing control, and racial composition, including: when the school was opened and the grades
served; dates that additional grades were added; enrollment and faculty for the preceding
three years, and at the school's establishment, by race; religious affiliation of the school and
religious denominations of faculty and students; number of scholarship recipients, by race;
black participation on athletic teams; information about affirmative action plans, and the
publicity given those plans; whether any person officially connected with the school had
limited or negated open admissions policies; names, addresses, and race of the school's incor-
porators, founders, and boardnembers; identities of individuals and entities that contrib-
uted assets; identity of any person or entity connected with the school's establishment that
advocated the school's racial segregation; and the identity of any official with membership
in an organization that advocated racial superiority. 382 F. Supp. at 936-39. Rev. Rul. 75-50
contains similar requirements. See text accompanying notes 115-22 supra.
134. In its reversal the Supreme Court had stipulated that determinations of eligibility by
the book board would be subject to judicial review. 413 U.S. at 471.
135. 382 F. Supp. at 924-25 (emphasis supplied). The court also referred to the second
factor necessary to establish a prima facie showing as "the total absence of blacks as students,
teachers or administrators." Id. at 925 (emphasis supplied).
136. Id. at 926.
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equally pertinent when the inquiry is whether a school has a racially
discriminatory policy as to students generally. The proposed proce-
dure's prima facie showing of discrimination and shifting burden of
proof are attributable to this case .37
The Service promulgated the guidelines for at least two reasons.
Enforcement efforts were considered ineffective, and schools that
discriminated had attained tax exempt status by superficial adher-
ence to the publicity guidelines in Revenue Procedure 75-50.' 3 In
addition, the Service was under pressure to take stronger measures.
Not only did the plaintiffs in Green reopen the case in 1976, alleging
that the Service was not in compliance with the district court in-
junction, but another claim also was filed, asserting that the Serv-
ice's nationwide enforcement effort was unsatisfactory.' 39 These ac-
tions were strong incentives for the Service to promulgate its own
procedure, and thus avoid issuance of an administratively burden-
some injunction.
When the first proposal was published in 1978, substantial oppo-
sition developed.'4 0 The guidelines also had their advocates, al-
though at least two agreed that revision was appropriate.' After the
137. In Brumfield v. Dodd, 405 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. La. 1975), the district court held that
Louisiana's assistance to private segregated schools, in the form of textbooks, classroom
materials, and funding for transportation, was unconstitutional. The court required private
schools seeking state aid to certify to their nondiscriminatory policy and to supply the state
with information substantially identical to the certification and data requirements of
Norwood. Compare id. at 350 with Norwood v. Harrison, 382 F. Supp. at 936. In a supplemen-
tal order, in which the district court reviewed the status of several private schools, the court
relied on Norwood for the correct approach to establishing a prima facie showing of discrimi-
nation. Brumfield v. Dodd, 425 F. Supp. 528, 531-32 (E.D. La. 1977).
The Service cites both Norwood and Brumfield in support of the proposed procedure.
Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 9,451, 9,452 (Rev.
Proc. § 2.04); see Proposed Revenue Procedure on Private Tax-Exempt Schools, 43 Fed. Reg.
37,296, 37,298 (Rev. Proc. § 4.02) (superceded); Kurtz Statement, supra note 13, at J-2;
Siegal, supra note 65.
138. See Kurtz Statement, supra note 13, at J-2; Siegal, supra note 65; IRS Plan to Penal-
ize Schools That Discriminate Denounced, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978, § A, at 25, col. 1.
139. Commissioner Kurtz referred to the cases in a statement before a congressional sub-
committee. Kurtz Statement, supra note 13, at J-2 (Wright v. Blumenthal, No. 76-1426
(D.D.C.); Green v. Blumenthal, No. 1355-69 (D.D.C.)). The Service has moved to dismiss
for lack of standing in Wright.
The Chairman of the Civil Rights Commission considered the guidelines overdue and
stated that the Commission would monitor their implementation. UPDATE, supra note 3, at
4.
140. See notes 3 & 4 supra & accompanying text.
141. Troyer, The Proposed Rules Deserve Support (Jan. 20, 1979), reprinted in TAX NoTEs
486
1979] NEW REVENUE PROCEDURE
revision was issued in 1979, however, other proponents believed the
guidelines had become too lenient."'
The Revised Procedure
The procedure is applicable only to private elementary and sec-
ondary schools that fall within one of two classes 1 Schools within
the designated class have the burden of showing that they have a
racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students.' One class, adju-
dicated schools, consists of schools found to discriminate against
minority students in a final decision of a federal or state court or
agency.'45 The more controversial class consists of schools founded
or substantially expanded during school desegregation in the com-
munity that the schools serve, that do not have significant minority
enrollment, and the formation or expansion of which "was related
in fact to public school desegregation in the community.""'4 These
(TWR) 203 (Feb. 19, 1979); Private School Discrimination, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1978, § A,
at 18, col. 1 (editorial).
142. The League of Women Voters was "outraged by IRS' retreat." Remarks of Regina
O'Leary before the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee (Feb. 21-22, 1979),
reprinted in [1979] 37 DAILY TAx REP. (BNA) J-17 [hereinafter cited as O'Leary]. An
assistant counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund believed the new
procedure was unconstitutional because it was so weak and said the revision was "ineffective
and administratively unworkable." Remarks of Bill Lee before the House Ways & Means
Oversight Subcommittee (Feb. 21-22, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 37 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA)
[hereinafter cited as Lee].
143. The procedure includes church-related and church-operated schools, but excludes
colleges, pre-schools, nurseries, and schools for blind or deaf students. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,452
(Rev. Proc. § 2.05).
The original procedure included a category designated "other schools", which is now omit-
ted. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. § 3.04). This classification included all schools not
otherwise covered by the procedure. The procedure contemplated scrutiny of other schools
under standards similar to those applied to adjudicated schools and reviewable schools, if an
insubstantial minority enrollment and other facts and circumstances warranted it. Id. at
37,298 (Rev. Proc. §§ 5.04, 6.03). IRS Chief Counsel explained that this classification's pur-
pose was "to cover the unusual situation where, for example, a college might be held by a
court to be discriminatory." Siegal, supra note 65.
The revised procedure contained several printing errors, most of which have been corrected.
44 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (1979). All references are to the corrected version.
144. The Service continues to rely on the definition of racially nondiscriminatory policy
used in Green and incorporated in Rev. Rul. 71-447. See notes 108-09 supra & accompanying
text.
145. In the first procedure the adjudicated school category embraced schools found to
discriminate generally; otherwise, the old and new provisions are substantially identical. See
note 2 supra.
146. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,452 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03). Most debate focused on the reviewable
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reviewable schools, and adjudicated schools, can keep or obtain
exemption by proof of enrollment of a significant number of minor-
ity students or by undertaking affirmative actions or programs.
Under the revised procedure, as in the first version, the question
that frequently will determine a school's tax status is whether the
school has a significant minority enrollment. One way of meeting
this requirement is by passing a mechanical test which requires the
school's "percentage of minority students [to be] 20 percent or
more of the percentage of the minority school age population in the
community served by the school." 4 ' The procedure's example pos-
tulates a community in which fifty percent of the school children are
minority and the relevant school's enrollment is 200. To qualify
under the test, the school must enroll twenty minority students."8
If the school discriminated against two or more minorities, the pro-
cedure requires the appropriate percentage be determined sepa-
rately for each group. 4 ' No example is given, but the calculation of
the minimum number of students of one minority group should not
change the school's total enrollment for the computation of the
minimum for the other minority. Thus, a school with an enrollment
of 200, having discriminated against blacks and Hispanics in a com-
munity in which thirty percent of the school children are black and
thirty percent are Hispanic, would be required to enroll twenty-four
students.5 ' The school should have no discretion and should be
schools category, but at least one critic also objected to the adjudicated schools category
because it includes schools found discriminatory by agencies. Remarks of Robert L. Lamborn
before the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee (Feb. 21-22, 1979), reprinted in
[1979] 37 DAmLY TAX REP. (BNA) J-10, J-11 [hereinafter cited as Lamborn].
147. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(b)).
148. The equation is 20% x 50% = 10%; 10% x 200 = 20.
149. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 3.05).
150. The equation is 20% x 30% = 6%; 6% + 6% = 12%; 12% x 200 = 24. The alternative
equation would allow the school's total minority enrollment to be less than the mechanical
test requires when only one minority is involved. Thus, if 60% of the student population was
black, and total enrollment was 200, then the minimum figure would be 24, the same number
obtained in the textual example (20% x 60% = 12%; 12% x 200 = 24). Using the hypothetical
in the text, but reducing school enrollment after allowance for satisfaction of the test as to
one minority, results in a lower figure-23. (20% x 30% = 6%; 6% x 200 = 12; 200 - 12 = 188;
6% x 188 = 11; 11 + 12 = 23).
The need for absolute precision in computation should be infrequent because the Service
can justify less rigorous scrutiny as a school's minority enrollment approaches the safe harbor
minimum. For example, if in good faith the above school is able to enroll only 9 blacks and
12 Hispanics, then allowance of exempt status under the affirmative actions and programs
test may be appropriate. One frequent bona fide limitation on meeting the safe harbor
probably will be insufficient funds to pay tuition.
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required to enroll at least twelve students of each minority, rather
than select all or a majority of the twenty-four from one of the two
groups. To permit a reduction in the enrollment by the number of
students of one minority before computing the minimum number of
the other minority, or to permit the school to select a dispropor-
tionate number of students from one group, would, in effect, allow
discrimination between the groups.
A showing of significant minority enrollment through the me-
chanical test is characterized as a "safe harbor",' because meeting
the test prevents classification as a reviewable school and satisfies
the quantum of proof required of an adjudicated school. A catch-
all provision, that a school's overt acts of racial discrimination will
preclude tax exemption, regardless of technical compliance with the
procedure, is inconsistent with the unqualified terms in which the
mechanical test is expressed. 5 Assuming the procedure is intended
to be internally consistent, and that all provisions have some pur-
pose, the logical construction of the safe harbor and catch-all provi-
sions is that the catch-all provision is applicable only to schools that
seek to qualify for exemption other than by the safe harbor stan-
dard. That a school with a minority enrollment substantial enough
to qualify for the safe harbor would commit overt acts of discrimina-
tion is unlikely, and a clash with the catch-all provision probably
will not occur. Moreover, overt acts sufficient to justify a denial of
exemption probably would be preceded by disenrollment of minori-
ties to the extent that the school no longer would qualify for the safe
harbor. The catch-all provision should operate only if a pattern of
discrimination is identified, because institutions can promote inte-
gration in good faith and nevertheless have uncooperative employ-
ees. The catch-all provision should be applied only when discrimi-
151. Kurtz Statement, supra note 13, at J-2; Siegal, supra note 65 (referring to the first
procedure).
152. If a school engages in any acts or practices that are racially discriminatory as
to students, the school is not entitled to tax exemption even though it may
otherwise comply with the provisions of Revenue Procedure 75-50 or this Reve-
nue Procedure. For example, if there are overt acts of racial discrimination as
to students, the school is not entitled to federal income tax exemption.
44 Fed. Reg. at 9,452 (Rev. Proc. §2.03) (as corrected by 44 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (1979)). The
first procedure was potentially more stringent; it referred to "any evidence" of a racially
discriminatory policy. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. § 1.05).
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nation is sanctioned institutionally, and not when isolated abuses
occur.
A showing of significant minority enrollment under the first pro-
cedure could be made only by satisfaction of the mechanical test.'53
Now, whether a school has a significant minority enrollment is a
question of fact.'54 In addition to the mechanical test, two other
examples of qualifying situations are noted. One example provides
that notice will be taken of a school's emphasis on special programs
or curricula, if they are of interest only to groups with few minority
members. This is characterized as the Amish and Hebrew exemp-
tion.'5 5 The remaining example apparently was promulgated for
Catholic schools, in that the provision permits consideration of the
aggregate number of minority students in a multi-school system in
a given community.1 51
A school is reviewable if its creation or substantial expansion was
during public school desegregation in the community. Substantial
expansion of a school is defined as an increase in students of more
than twenty percent over the number of students enrolled during
the preceding calendar year.' 7 Court-ordered plans, those made
with government participation, and voluntary plans are all consid-
ered in computing the period during which desegregation oc-
curred.' 6 The period of public school desegregation includes all of
153. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 to 37,298 (Rev. Proc. § 4.01(1), 4.02(1)).
154. "Whether a school's minority student enrollment is significant depends on all the
relevant facts and circumstances." 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(b)).
155. One writer believed the new procedure would be inapplicable to Hebrew and Amish
schools. IRS Softens Proposal Aimed at "desegregation Academies' [sic], Wash. Post, Feb.
10, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 6. A Christian school representative identified the examples in §
3.03(b) as written for Jewish, Amish, and Catholic schools. Remarks of J.C. Barnhart before
the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee (Feb. 21-22, 1979), reprinted in [1979]
37 DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-16 [hereinafter cited as Barnhart].
156. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(b)). A representative of the United States
Catholic Conference considered the provisions a step in the right direction, commenting that
the treatment given private school systems "should avoid many unnecessary problems", but
he was dissatisfied with the definition of community. Remarks of George E. Reed before the
House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee (Feb. 21-22, 1979), reprinted in [1979] 37
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) J-12 [hereinafter cited as Reed].
157. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(a)). The first procedure imposed a stricter
standard of 10 percent. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03).
158. The procedure provides:
(a) A school will be considered formed or substantially expanded at the time of
public school desegregation in the community served by the school if its forma-
tion or expansion takes place during any calendar year any part of which falls
[Vol. 20:463
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any calendar year, any part of which is within the twelve month
period preceding implementation of a desegregation plan. Thus, a
school's formation or expansion can anticipate a plan's implementa-
tion by over twenty-three months and be within the procedure's
ambit.'5 9 The relevant period continues for three years after sub-
stantial implementation of a plan. The precise moment when imple-
mentation begins, and when substantial implementation is
achieved, in a given community may be subject to several differing
viewpoints, all of which may be reasonable. 60 An attempt to further
refine the concept of the relevant time period would be unproduc-
tive however; the time period provided in the guidelines has suffi-
cient flexibility for equitable resolutions of the question by the Serv-
ice or a court.
Familiarity with the definitions of "community" and "minority"
is necessary to understand the procedure's operation. A school's
community is the school district in which the school is located, in
addition to other districts from which a substantial percentage of
the students is derived.'' Also included in a school's community are
school districts from, or to which, students are assigned by judicial
mandate, if the district in which the school is located, or other
districts from which the school obtains a substantial percentage of
within the period beginning one year before implementation of a public school
desegregation plan in the community (whether a court-ordered or voluntary
plan) and ending three years after substantial implementation of such desegre-
gation order or plan. "Voluntary plan" includes, for example, a written desegre-
gation plan entered into with the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW), or with a state agency.
44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(a)). The first guidelines differ from the revision in
that the desegregation period was measured by the times of initial and final implementation
of desegregation plans. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03).
159. For example, if implementation began in December, 1970, a school that was formed
or substantially expanded in January, 1969, would be covered.
160. For example, the change in language from the first to the revised procedure might be
a basis for refusing to construe "implementation" to mean "initial implementation", or the
prior language may be evidence that "implementation" should be read to include the modifier
"initial". See note 158 supra. Different results can be supported by reliance on various rules
of statutory construction. Another potential disagreement is the question whether a period
should be measured by a particular desegregation plan, or by any desegregation plan affecting
the community served by the school.
The Service probably will read this provision broadly. Thus, certain schools established
without discriminatory purpose, the formation of which only fortuitously coincided with
desegregation, will have to prove their good faith under the procedure. Their number should
be small, however, and the burden imposed on them is more than justified by the end sought.
161. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 to 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 3.04).
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its enrollment, are affected by the court decree. The procedure indi-
cates that twenty percent usually will be considered a substantial
percentage of a school's enrollment. Minorities with which the pro-
cedure expressly is concerned are "blacks; Hispanics; Asians or Pa-
cific Islanders; and American Indians or Alaskan natives.' '1 2 This
covers natives of all continents but Europe, and therefore seems to
apply to virtually every racial minority that might be discriminated
against.' 3 Should a group fall outside the definition, the procedure
nevertheless is applicable because the definition's wording is not
exclusive.
The most significant change in the revised procedure is that a
reviewable school's formation or expansion must be related in fact
to community school desegregation.' 4 The guidelines provide that
the presence of the first criterion, formation or expansion during
desegregation, ordinarily is an indication that the formation or ex-
pansion was related in fact to desegregation.'65 This is referred to as
the general rule, but the provision is flexible in that it provides for
a test based on all the facts and circumstances. Although the provi-
sion lists fourteen considerations that might be relevant in making
the in fact determination,' 6 it has been criticized by some because
162. Id. at 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 3.05).
163. Two groups that, theoretically, might be excluded from the procedure's express cate-
gories are Arabs native to North Africa and Australian aborigines. Even these "races" might
be classifiable as Asiatic and black, respectively. Perhaps a more relevant question is into
which category Jews might fit. Asiatic is a logical answer for Jews also, but ultimately the
classification issue is not a major concern because the most pervasive discrimination is
against the easily identifiable blacks and Hispanics. Moreover, the procedure does not ex-
clude any racial minority from its coverage.
164. The guidelines formerly provided that a school's creation or expansion during desegre-
gation, together with failure of the mechanical test, would result in the school being classified
as reviewable. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,297 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03).
165. [Ordinarily] the formation or substantial expansion of a school at the time
of public school desegregation in the community will be considered to be related
in fact to the public school desegregation. However, notwithstanding this gen-
eral rule, the Service will consider evidence that a school's formation or substan-
tial expansion was not related in fact to public school desegregation in the
community and that the school therefore is not a reviewable school. The deter-
mination that a school's formation or substantial expansion is not related in fact
to public school desegregation must be based on objective evidence, taking into
account all the facts and circumstances relating to the school's formation or
expansion.
44 Fed. Reg. at 9,453 (Rev. Proc. § 3.03(c)).
166. Facts tending to indicate that the formation or substantial expansion of a
NEW REVENUE PROCEDURE
school was not related in fact to public school desegregation include the follow-
ing:
(1) The students to whom the opening or substantial expansion of the school
is attributable are not to any significant extent drawn from the public school
grades subject to desegregation in the community served by the school. For
example, the students may be drawn from other private schools, or from other
areas not undergoing public school desegregation.
(2) The rate of expansion is not greater than the rate of expansion experienced
by the school in years prior to the time of public school desegregation, as defined
in section 3.03(a) of this procedure.
(3) The expansion is attributable to an increase in the school age population
in the community.
(4) The expanion results from a merger of the school with another private
school and neither of the schools is otherwise "reviewable."
(5) The expansion is attributable to a continuation of previous periodic expan-
sion by adding grade levels as the school's enrollment in lower grades advance,
and the school does not enroll a significant number of new students in the newly
added grades from the public schools.
(6) The school was formed or expanded in accordance with a longstanding
practice of a religion or religious denomination which itself is not racially dis-
-criminatory to provide schools for religious education when circumstances are
present making it practical to do so (such as a sufficient number of persons of
that religious belief in the community to support the school), and such circum-
stances are not attributable to a purpose of excluding minorities.
(7) At the time of formation or expansion, the school had some minority
students, faculty or board members.
Facts tending to indicate that the formation or substantial expansion of a
school was related in fact to public school desegregation in the community
include:
(8) The opening or substantial expansion of the school occurs in one or more
of the same grades that are subject to public school desegregation.
(9) The students who enroll are primarily drawn from the public schools.
(10) The school occupies or utilizes former public school facilities made avail-
able to the school in the course of implementation of the public school desegre-
gation plan.
(11) The school is a member of an organization which practices or advocates
racial segregation in schools.
(12) The school, or its founders, officers, substantial contributors or trustees,
have engaged in efforts to oppose desegregation of the public schools.
(13) The school in practice limits enrollment to students from a geographic
area (or areas) with few or no minorities, and this limitation coincides with a
public school desegregation plan that involves exchanges of students between
such area or areas and one or more other areas that have a substantial school
age minority population.
(14) Non-minority faculty members added to the school's staff at the time of
its formation or substantial expansion are drawn primarily from the public
school system subject to desegregation.
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it creates a presumption'67 and by others as an emasculation of the
entire revenue procedure.' Both criticisms assume too mhuch; sensi-
tive application can make the in fact requirement a central element
of equitable administration. The general rule approach is in accord
with the logic of Norwood, and the facts and circumstances test
accommodates schools the opening or expansion of which only inci-
dentally coincided with desegregation. The in fact provision does
not put the burden of proof on the Service;' the provision contem-
plates the Service's consideration of data submitted to it, not a
search by the Service of evidence to support the general rule.
In a speech given before the revised procedure was released, the
Service's Chief Counsel indicated that the IRS was considering im-
plementation of the first procedure by sending requests for informa-
tion to private schools in school districts in which desegregation has
occurred. 70 If the Service anticipates adhering to this plan, presum-
ably it will select for scrutiny those schools that do not meet the safe
harbor provision and examine the information submitted for evi-
dence of the schools' policies towards minorities. This seems reason-
able,' 7 but neither the speech nor the procedure give consideration
to determinations of nondiscrimination by courts, HEW, or other
agencies. "2 Provision for waiver of the data submission require-
ments could remedy this omission without further complicating the
procedure. Requests for waiver could be submitted to the Service
together with documentation evidencing a prior showing of nondis-
crimination. Waiver should not be assured on the basis of an earlier
determination, but absent evidence of a collusive forum or ineffec-
167. Lamborn, supra note 146, at J-9; Reed, supra note 156, at J-11.
168. Lee, supra note 142, at J-15; O'Leary, supra note 142, at J-19.
169. But see Lee, supra note 142; O'Leary, supra note 142.
170. Siegal, supra note 65.
171. After changing its position in 1970, the Service spent over three years examining data
submitted to it by private schools. EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 23, at 169 n.438.
Although schools lost exemptions based on the IRS survey, the three year review period was
too long. Fewer schools would be involved in the implementation of the new procedure, and
the Service should attempt to review submitted information quickly.
172. A major criticism of the Service has been that it does not coordinate sufficiently with
HEW. See id. at 192-94. Because many of the schools covered by the procedure receive no
direct or indirect federal aid, the argument for the use of forms and procedures in conjunction
with HEW is less compelling than in other areas. An example of an area in which improved
coordination might be more effective is scrutiny of administration of scholarship funds in
colleges and universities. Johnson & Orleans, supra note 23.
In contrast with the new procedure, Rev. Proc. 75-50 provides that certain records kept for
other government agencies will meet the Service's requirements. 1975-2 C.B. at 590.
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tive methodology, another agency or court determination should be
honored.7 3 An exemption provision would prevent the Service from
duplicating work previously done somewhere else, and it would save
the school the expense of gathering information for submission.'
The affirmative actions or programs test in the revised procedure
differs significantly from the 1978 version. 7 5 Under the 1978 guide-
lines, a school unable to pass the. mechanical test could show a
nondiscriminatory policy as to students only by implementing at
least four out of five specified affirmative action programs. 6 The
new alternative to a showing of significant minority enrollment lists
six acceptable affirmative action programs, but does not require
that a minimum number be undertaken.7 7 The new facts and cir-
173. All determinations are not equally rigorous. For example, in Norwood v. Harrison, the
district court reviewed the state textbook board's certification of eligibility of seven schools,
found four to be racially discriminatory, and permitted one to receive aid only provisionally.
The court agreed with the board's decision on the other two schools.
174. Although the burden on a school may be less onerous if it has undergone previous court
or administrative scrutiny, the relevant data still must be updated and put in the appropriate
format.
175. [Actions] and programs reasonably designed to attract minority students
must convey clearly to the affected minority community that, notwithstanding
the circumstances of the school's formation or expansion and the absence of a
significant number of minority students, the school, in fact, is operating on a
nondiscriminatory basis and minorities are welcome at the school. The level of
actions and programs that are adequate may vary from school to school and
depends on the circumstances of the school, including the level of minority
student enrollment.
44 Fed. Reg. at 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 4.03) (emphasis supplied).
176. 43 Fed. Reg. at 37,298 (Rev. Proc: § 4.03). These programs were similar to those
contained in the revised procedure. See note 177 infra.
177. Examples of actions and programs that may contribute to attracting minority
students on a continuing basis include:
1. Active and vigorous minority recruitment programs, such as extensive
public advertisements in media designed to reach the minority community,
specifically inviting minority applicants; communication to minority groups
and minority leaders in the community inviting minority applicants: Personal
contacts of prospective minority students; and, participation in local, regional,
or national programs designed to develop new sources of minority recruitment
for the school.
2. Publicized offering of tuition waivers, scholarships, or other financial assis-
tance, with emphasis on their availability for minority students; or, actual
granting of such financial assistance to minority students.
3. Employment of, or substantial efforts to recruit, minority teachers or other
professional staff.
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cumstances test is at least as rigorous as the old one, however.
Unlike the old test the new one requires a school's efforts "convey
clearly" that the school has a nondiscriminatory policy in fact,7 8
and the test concludes with a caveat that failure of affirmative
actions to attract minority students will be a consideration in deter-
mining the adequacy of the school's efforts. Thus, the new provision
is more reasonable than the old because it allows for the possible
effectiveness of one or two affirmative action programs, and because
it does not require what might be an unnecessary and expensive
minimum number of acts.
The requirement that a school convey clearly to the minority
community that it does not discriminate, "and [that] minorities
are welcome" in fact,' is susceptible to at least two interpretations.
If the requirement is that the minority community actually believe
the school has a nondiscriminatory policy as to students, then the
provision can entail awesome administrative burdens. Assuming the
requirement establishes a subjective standard, then the first ques-
tion is who would be responsible for determining what the minority
community actually believes. If the Service assumes the task, then
it must equip its examining agents with the appropriate question-
naires and instructions in polling techniques. If the schools are re-
quired to establish what the minority community actually believes,
then the Service will need to develop a method for evaluating what
the schools submit. Attempting to determine what people actually
believe would be difficult and costly, and the results would be sub-
ject to interminable challenges. Another drawback of a subjective
standard is its adverse effect on the freedoms of speech and associa-
4. Participation with integrated schools in sports, music, and other events or
activities.
5. Special minority-oriented curriculum or orientation programs.
6. Minority members of the board or other governing body of the school.
The failure of such actions or programs to obtain some minority student
enrollment within a reasonable period of time will be a factor in determining
whether such activities are adequate or are undertaken in good faith.
44 Fed. Reg. at 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 4.03).
178. See note 175 supra. Compare Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587, 588: "The school must
make its racially nondiscriminatory policy known to all segments of the general community
served by the school."
179. At least one critic has identified the two interpretations discussed in the text:
"[A]ctions and programs . . . should be judged by reasonable standards of performance
rather than by the subsequent perception of the minority community which may conceivably
not be amenable to persuasion." Lamborn, supra note 146, at J-10.
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tion.10 A more feasible construction of the convey clearly provision
is that a school that wants to qualify under the affirmative actions
and programs test must demonstrate that the minority community
is aware of the school's nondiscriminatory policy. Although this also
is a burdensome requirement, it can be justified by the abuses
that occurred when more liberal procedures were in effect. A show-
ing that the minority community is aware of the school's policies is
more susceptible to effective administrative and judicial review.
The standard of a reasonably well-informed member of the minority
community can be used to determine awareness. It is not an ideal
measure, but it is sufficiently objective to be administratively work-
able, and it does not entail an unacceptable encroachment upon
first amendment interests.
Should a school not meet the guidelines' standards, the Service
will consider, on application of the school, allowing the school a
grace period in which to comply. 1s8 The procedure also provides for
review of all determinations of exempt status by the National
Office."8 2
Administrative Discretion and First Amendment Issues
The threshold issue is whether implementation of the guidelines
exceeds the scope of the Service's authority. Congressional critics
have persisted in contending that the procedure encroaches on the
legislative prerogative." 3 Under Green v. Connally and Goldsboro
180. See text accompanying notes 204-07 infra.
181. To defer exemption revocation, a school must show actions taken, and to be taken, in
good faith to comply with the affirmative actions and programs test. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,454
(Rev. Proc. § 5.04). Norwood is precedent for this. The district court was unsure whether one
school was segregated purposefully. The court ultimately allowed the students to use state
textbooks for a probationary period, during which the school could initiate affirmative actions
and programs. 382 F. Supp. at 934-35.
182. 44 Fed. Reg. at 9,454 (Rev. Proc. § 7).
183. Several Congressmen introduced similar resolutions:
Whereas Congress has the sole constitutionally mandated authority and re-
sponsibility to enact, amend, or repeal the law of the land; and
Whereas Congress has passed law exempting from taxation certain organiza-
tions including those organized and operated exclusively for education purposes;
and
Whereas [thel proposed procedures do not reflect the intent of Congress:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That, it
is the sense of Congress that (1) this usurpation of congressional authority be
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Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, however, the Service has
a duty to deny or revoke the tax exemptions of private segregated
schools. That an adjudicated school should be denied exempt status
is clear. "4 Although the guidelines deviate from the elements of the
prima facie showing in Norwood v. Harrison in three respects, the
Service's indicia of reviewable schools are no more onerous than the
criteria applied to Mississippi schools in that case. Norwood re-
ferred to the relevant time of school expansion or establishment as
"close upon the heels of" and "during the wake of" massive desegre-
gation.'8 The reviewable school classification includes schools ex-
panded or established before desegregation was accomplished, but
this is consistent with Norwood's purpose. Some schools were ex-
panded or formed with the purpose of avoidance in anticipation of
desegregation. This was particularly true after certain school dis-
tricts' freedom of choice plans were determined to be inadequate,
and parents in other communities realized that desegregation in
those districts in fact had occurred.8 6 The "wake" of desegregation
can be prolonged, and the procedure's three year provision is reason-
able. A school formed or expanded three years after substantial
implementation may be suspect, because financial constraints or
inadequate organization may have delayed plans that were made
on the "heels" of desegregation. Substantial time between the
incentive to form a private school and its opening also may be
attributable to the changing identities of concerned parents. For
denied and (2) the above-mentioned proposed revenue procedure not be adopted
by the Internal Revenue Service.
H.R. Con. Res. 9, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (introduced by Rep. Evans, in January); see,
e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 11, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. Con. Res. 39, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). See also Statement in Opposition to the IRS Proposed Revenue Procedure Relating
to Private Tax Exempt Schools, 125 CONG. REc. E746 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1979) (extension of
remarks of Rep. Young); The IRS and the Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools and Other
Charitable Institutions, 125 CONG. REc. E801 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (extension of remarks
of Rep. Donan).
At least five Congressmen also testified against the revised procedure before the House of
Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee. See Robinson, IRS Defends Revised School
Guidelines, [1979] 8 TAx NoTEs (TWR) 252. Senator Jepsen testified against the procedure
before the Senate Finance Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management. See [1979]
83 DAILY TAx ReP. (BNA) G-5.
184. But see Lamborn, supra note 146, at J-10 to J-11.
185. See note 135 supra & accompanying text.
186. In Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court held that ineffective
freedom of choice plans were unconstitutional and that school boards were responsible for
adopting plans that would bring about integration immediately.
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example, a parent whose child is beginning the final year of high
school may be an enthusiastic organizer in the fall, but a dis-
interested observer after his child's graduation in the spring.
Similarly, parents of a three year old child may not feel the same
sense of urgency as parents of school-age children, but they may
find themselves to be intimately concerned with establishing a
segregated school when the child reaches its sixth birthday. Con-
troversy has focused on the extent to which public school desegre-
gation has caused "white flight."'8 7 Desegregation was imposed
concurrently with lowered academic achievement, increased dis-
ciplinary problems, and the prohibition of prayer in the public
schools, and these changes are cited as the reasons for the estab-
lishment of many private schools. Nevertheless, that white dis-
enrollment from public school followed desegregation, particularly
in large cities,' 8 is clear. Moreover, disciplinary and academic
decline may have been the result, rather than the cause, of white
flight.'89 The "in fact" requirement of the procedure should protect
those schools that really were established for nondiscriminatory rea-
sons.
In Norwood, the pertinent criterion of discrimination was total
absence of minorities, 90 but the guidelines provide that a school can
be reviewable, despite minority enrollment, if it does not meet the
mechanical test. The guidelines' more rigorous standard may be
necessary to prevent schools from attaining exempt status by ob-
taining a token number of minority students.' The "in fact" re-
187. A recent examination of the disparate causes of white flight, or avoidance, is E.
CATALDO, D. GTLIN & M. GILES, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLCY (1978).
188. See Coleman, New Incentives for Desegregation, 7 HumAN IGHTS 10, 13 (1978). Cole-
man stated that city public schools' losses of white students are extensive only "when the
proportion of blacks in the city is high, or when there are predominately white suburbs to
flee to, or both. But. . .in all large American cities, one of these two conditions holds, and
in most, both conditions hold." Id. Many inner-city public schools have become predomi-
nantly black. The reasons for this phenomenon are complex:
Desegregation, [the U.S. Civil Rights Commission] argued, cannot take all the
blame for the flight of white families from cities to the suburbs. "I prefer to call
it middle class flight," said commission Vice Chairman Stephen Horn. The
middle class follows industry and jobs to the suburbs, escaping a rising inner-
city tax rate and deteriorating downtowns as much as integration, he said.
Civil Rights Panel Criticizes Pace of Desegregation, Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1979, § A, at 2, col.
1, at col. 3.
189. But see Will, Tax-Exempt Schools and Statistical 'Justice, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 1978,
§ D, at 7, col. 5.
190. See note 135 supra & accompanying text.
191. In Brumfield v. Dodd, 425 F. Supp. 528, 535 (E.D. La. 1976), in which the court
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quirement, not contained in Norwood, is a check on the mechanical
test and the expansion of the relevant time period; the "in fact"
requirement and its general rule provide the flexibility necessary for
equitable administration of the guidelines. The Service has discre-
tion in promulgating procedures, and adherence to the principle of
Norwood is the appropriate measure of validity. Rigid conformity
with the case's details is not the correct standard, and the three
refinements that now modify Norwood's prima facie showing of dis-
crimination are within the scope of the Service's administrative
authority.
The guidelines provide, as did Norwood, that a school can over-
come a showing of discriminatory policy by presenting objective
evidence of affirmative actions to attract minority students.9 2 To
the extent that the procedure lists all the examples of acceptable
programs contained in Norwood, in addition to others, it imposes a
lesser burden. Neither list is intended to be exclusive, however;
effectiveness is the criterion of a program's acceptibility. The ulti-
mate test of efficacy is the mechanical one, in that a school which
qualifies for the safe harbor no longer must prove that it is taking
affirmative actions to obtain minorities. Properly understood, the
mechanical test is not a new requirement; rather, it is a means of
relief not provided in Norwood.
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke"' does not pre-
vent the Service from requiring adjudicated and reviewable schools
to actively recruit minorities.'94 Bakke involved an applicant to a
state medical school who successfully challenged a special admis-
sions program under which certain minority applicants were given
favorable treatment solely on the basis of race. Not only did Bakke
involve a situation substantially different from the type with which
the procedure is concerned, but Justice Powell's "controlling" opin-
ion"'9 excluded from its ambit institutions shown to have discrimi-
adopted the Norwood test, one of the segregated schools that sought unsuccessfully to qualify
for state assistance had enrolled one black student, but only after notification that the
school's policies were to undergo judicial scrutiny.
192. The pertinent provision is at note 177 supra.
193. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
194. The problem is noted in Siegal, supra note 65. For a discussion of Bakke that predated
the final decision, see Saunders, supra note 23.
195. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun believed the special admissions
program was constitutional. 438 U.S. at 324-26. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
Stewart, and Stevens did not reach the constitutional issue, but stated that the program
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nated in the past.' Moreover, Powell's emphasis was on the unjus-
tifiable detrimental impact on an innocent class,'97 and the proce-
dure anticipates no analogous deprivation of white school children's
rights. The safe harbor test is not an unconstitutional quota; rather,
the test is simply an alternative way in which a school may satisfy
its burden of proof.'"" Moreover, the examples of affirmative action
programs in the procedure are consistent with Chief Justice Burger's
Norwood opinion, in which he stated that a school's qualification for
the state book-lending program should depend upon an evaluation
of affirmative declarations of admissions policies, identification of
racial and religious minorities, and other relevant data. "'
With varying degrees of descriptive accuracy,2 0 "Christian" is the
designation that many private segregated schools give themselves,
and therefore, establishment and free exercise clause problems
are inherent in administration of the procedure. Bob Jones Univer-
sity is a unique institution, which can be distinguished easily from
conventional private segregated elementary and secondary schools,
and to which the procedure is inapplicable. Nevertheless, Bob
Jones University v. United States is a departure from the Service's
interpretation of section 501(c)(3). The Service believes an institu-
tion must be charitable to qualify under section 501(c)(3), and it
makes no exception for religious organizations in any form.20 ' If the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals agrees that Bob Jones University
is a religious entity and affirms the district court's decision, the
effect of its opinion will be greatest outside the law of private edu-
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 411, 421. Arguably, whether a particu-
lar program is constitutional depends on its ability to withstand Justice Powell's scrutiny,
because he is the only Justice with whom four others agree. Id. at 269-72. A conclusion is
tentative, however, because the other Justices concurred only in Powell's result, and not in
his analysis; moreover, a Justice may take an inconsistent position in a later case.
196. In discussing employment discrimination cases, Justice Powell noted that an adminis-
trative finding of discrimination can justify racial preferences. Id. at 301-02. The proposed
procedure is encompassed within this statement. But see Barnhart, supra note 155, at J-16.
197. 438 U.S. at 304-10.
198. But see Barnhart, supra note 155.
199. 413 U.S. at 471.
200. A former lobbyist for the NAACP stated, "Every school that's been started to evade
desegregation has called itself Christian . . . . That's not my idea of being Christian." IRS
Plan to Penalize Schools that Discriminate Denounced, Wash. Post, Dec. 6, 1978, § A, at 25,
col. 1, at 26, col. 3; see EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 23, at 189-91. Perhaps the most
adamant opponents of the procedure represent Christian schools. See [1979] 83 DAILY TAX
REP. (BNA) G-5, G-6.
201. See Rev. Rul. 75-231, 1975-1 C.B. 158.
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cational institutions. Its primary significance will be in its implica-
tions for conventional religious institutions, rather than schools.
A reversal would not threaten religious freedom, however,.because
few individual members of minority groups will seek to participate
in religions, the tenets of which include belief in racial segregation.
Very few public policies are as imperative as the need to desegregate
society; frequent encroachment on religious freedom on other public
policy grounds is most unlikely.
The competing interests in the Fourth Circuit, represented by
Goldsboro and Bob Jones University, are the public policy against
discrimination in education and the parental and student interest
in exercising religious freedom. Analysis based on the relative
weight each interest should be accorded can result in a debision
affirming or reversing Bob Jones University, but the better reasoned
outcome is reversal. ' If the essential element of the religion clauses
is freedom to believe, then the requirement that schools and reli-
gions not discriminate is not an excessive encroachment on the first
amendment. The free exercise clause also protects divinely inspired
acts, but this protection is not absolute. The sincerity of the beliefs
supporting the acts do not necessarily change this result; the gov-
ernment could not function if important national interests couild be
frustrated by religious dogmata. If other circuits follow Brown v.
Dade Christian Schools, Inc., the frequency with which the issue
arises will be insignificant. Even in Goldsboro, the district court did
not find the school's discriminatory practices qualified as the exer-
cise of religion; the judge assumed this essential fact. 03
The requirement that a school convey clearly that it is nondiscri-
minatory in fact is important because even the most enlightened
good faith policies will be ineffective if the minority community is
unaware of them. One construction of the requirement is unaccepta-
ble, however. If this provision were construed as mandating that the
minority community actually must believe the school operates in a
nondiscriminatory manner, the burden would be so great-perhaps
impossible-that the provision would violate the first amend-
ment.2 11 Speech and association rights are appropriate restrictions
202. The text following this note is similar to the Service's position. See Remarks of J.
Kurtz, Commissioner, at PLI Conference in New York City (Jan. 9, 1978), reprinted in
[1978] 9 FED. TAX (P-H) 54,820 [hereinafter cited as PLI Conference Remarks].
203. 436 F. Supp. at 1317.
204. Rigorous scrutiny is appropriate when the government insists that speech have a
particular effect on the audience, and in some instances the first amendment also will prevent
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on government action when the government seeks not only to re-
quire that particular ideas be expressed, but that the audience
believe those ideas. The regulation is most egregious when the idea
to be communicated conflicts with the speaker's previous practices.
After concerted efforts have been made for some time,'"' then a
subjective standard might be reasonable, but to require actual belief
at the outset of a publicity campaign would be unfair. Freedoms of
speech and association, however, are no more absolute than reli-
gious freedom. An interpretation of the convey clearly requirement
that the minority community must be aware of a formerly segre-
gated school's new policy is the reasonable alternative. When apply-
ing the requirement, the Service should determine whether commu-
nication of the new policy has been received in fact by the minority
community; if the reasonably well-informed member of the minor-
ity community is aware of a formerly segregated school's new policy,
this alone will constitute significant progress.
Practice of segregation by a section 501(c)(3) organizaton is an-
tithetical to the public benefit rationale of the charitable provisions,
but the charitable entity, school or church, may preach segregation
under the first amendment. A school or religious organization
should not be disqualified from tax exempt status solely because it
has expressed a belief in segregation; a construction of the procedure
that would result in denial of exemption to a school soley because
it exercised its freedom of speech would be unconstitutional." 6 Al-
though a school's speech will be chilled by the requirement that it
"convey clearly" to the minority community that it operates in a
nondiscriminatory manner, this is not equivalent to an absolute bar.
The curtailment of robust and open debate is justified by the impor-
tant countervailing public interest in desegregation. What the pro-
cedure does is impose a heavy burden on a reviewable or adjudi-
cated school. If a school wishes to publicize its belief in segregation,
then it may, but it also must convey to the community that it does
the state from requiring that certain messages be communicated. Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977). Moreover, due process may be denied if the application of the procedure
imposes a requirement that is impossible to meet.
205. The amount of time necessary to convince the minority community that a school
indeed operates in a nondiscriminatory manner will vary with the circumstances. In some
instances two or three months may be sufficient; in extreme instances as much as two years
may be necessary.
206. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).
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not practice those beliefs. The heavy burden of the convey clearly
provision is mitigated by the freedom that persons associated with
the institution have to express their opinions in their individual
capacities." ' A person identified with the school, however, can en-
danger its exemption by openly encouraging segregative policies,
and his speech, to that extent, also may be chilled. Presumably,
most schools and individuals will be concerned more with qualifying
for tax exemption than with publicizing their belief in segregation,
and therefore, the problem should arise infrequently.
The irony of the segregated schools problem is most evident here.
The number of minority students who would want to attend Bob
Jones University or Goldsboro Christian Schools must be insignifi-
cant."8 Attendance at a school where the administration and stu-
dents are opposed to integration is different from use of the same
lunch counter or bus seat. Inherent in the traditional primary and
secondary educational processes are participation and communica-
tion in relatively small groups for periods in excess of thirty hours
per week. This is not equivalent to regular or occasional commercial
contacts. Few minority students would select institutions that be-
lieve minorities are inferior,00 and minority attendance should
decrease proportionally with the strength of a school's convictions.
For example, assuming the applicants to Dade Christian Schools
did not know of the school's discriminatory beliefs, 21 their con-
207. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 807 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)
(corporate shareholders, employees, and customers may communicate ideas prohibited to the
corporation).
208. In addition to idealogical objections, another constraint on minority student atten-
dance at private schools is financial; tuition for private education is too expensive for many
middle and low-income parents, minority and white. A few minority parents, nevertheless,
may insist on sending their children to segregated private schools for one or several reasons.
Rationales may include a desire to provide their children with more rigorous academic and
disciplinary training than may be available in public schools. In urban communities, the
children's safety also may be a consideration. An additional incentive is that schools that
comply with the procedure will offer scholarships to minority students. Some parents may
desire that their children be exposed to a hostile environment to prepare them for possible
prejudice in adulthood. Whatever the motive, the imposition on formerly segregated schools
of these few students would be insubstantial, regardless of whether a school's prejudice is
divinely or socially inspired.
209. Religiously inspired segregative theory has been refined. Today, belief in the inferior-
ity of other races is expressed less frequently than is the equally questionable idea that
interracial contact in and of itself violates Biblical proscriptions. See Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. at 1317.
210. See note 76 supra.
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tinued attendance after discovering those beliefs is doubtful. If
segregated schools would open in good faith their admission
policies and operate in a nondiscriminatory manner, they would
discover that few minority students would attend, and parental
fears of detriment to their children from contact with minority
youth would be shown to be as unfounded in fact as they are in
theory. Thus, although religious or secular belief in segregation
and implementation of affirmative action programs are inconsist-
ent, compliance with the revenue procedure can be achieved with-
out the onset of institutional schizophrenia.
The Policy Questions and the Proposed Legislation
Generally, the Service must be alert for abuses of section
501(c)(3) because lax administration invites creative distortion of
the charitable provisions' purpose. For example, schemes involving
mail order ministries2t' are innovations that, if unchecked, could
have a serious adverse impact on the fisc. Segregated schools do not
represent a similar financial threat. The substantial efforts the
Service has taken to identify racially discriminatory private schools
may not generate a commensurate increase in revenue, but that the
procedure's promulgation and implementation costs may exceed the
concomitant increase in taxes paid does not detract from the proce-
dure's value: the unquantified benefit from the guidelines' enforce-
ment would exceed any net pecuniary loss.
Estimates are that the guidelines would apply to twenty adjudi-
cated schools and up to 3000 reviewable schools.212 The increase in
gross tax revenues these schools represent is probably small, in part
because few of the schools have adjusted net income, and because
some schools may be unable to operate after the predictable de-
crease in contributions.2 13 Moreover, donors still may avoid taxation
by making contributions to other exempt organizations; this shift in
philanthropy nevertheless benefits society because entities that are
211. Commissioner Kurtz has detailed the elements of schemes that involve the taxpayer
becoming a minister, taking a vow of poverty, and donating all his possessions to his church:
"Typically, the solicitations [to purchase such a church plan] conclude that a vow of poverty
can make a person rich." PLI Conference Remarks, supra note 202.
212. UPDATE, supra note 3, at 1; cf. Troyer, The Proposed Rules Deserve Support (Jan. 20,
1979), reprinted in [1978] 8 TAX NoTEs (TWR) 203 (between 3,000 and 4,000 segregation
academies formed in 13 Southern states by 1976). Commissioner Kurtz estimated that school
districts in which desegregation was imposed contain 6,500 private schools. Robinson, IRS
Defends Revised School Guidelines, [1979] 8 TAX NoTS (TWR) 252.
213. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. Connally, 341 F. Supp. 277, 281 (D.S.C. 1971).
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in fact charitable might receive more funding. More lasting and
substantial than the financial change would be the effect of denial
of exempt status on the minority community. The minority com-
munity's awareness that private segregated schools have lost their
tax exemptions would have substantial psychological value at least
equal to any net pecuniary loss due to enforcement costs.214 Assum-
ing some private segregated schools close when they lose their ex-
empt status, the public school system will incur greater costs to the
extent former private school students enroll in public schools. How-
ever, a decrease in the social costs attributable to segregated schools
also will occur. 215 Social cost to the community is present whenever
a private segregated school distorts the perspective of its students.21,
Recent articles queston the assumptions underlying Brown v. Board
of Education on the basis of studies that reflect decreased student
achievement and self-esteem since integration,2 17 but to the extent
"white flight" is the cause of these declines, Brown's premise may
be confirmed. Moreover, studies also can be found that show blacks
have made gains in education since Brown.28 Whether Chief Justice
Warren was "correct" does not change the conclusion that social
tensions are as much a product of what the races believe is true, as
they are a product of what is actually true.2 9 Although the social
214. For an example of the strong feelings that can be stimulated by a symbol over 100
years after the Civil War, see Stir Over Flag, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 1978, § B, at 1, col. 6, which
recounts the controversy in a Virginia public school over the appropriate emblem for the
school. At issue was the use of a Confederate flag, which the white students considered an
important traditional symbol, but the blacks believed represented slavery. See note 219 infra.
215. If fewer contributions caused some private segregated schools to close or increase their
tuition, this would force a return of at least some students to the public school system. Less
social benefit will accrue in communities where loss of exemption only forces consolidation
of private segregated schools, with little decrease in the total number of private school stu-
dents.
216. An example of a more subtle cost to desegregated public schools and the community
is the loss of the participation of parents in school affairs. Researchers have identified parents
who send their children to private schools as generally being more active and interested in
school activities than parents whose children attend public schools. E. CATALDO, D. CATLIN,
& M. GILES, supra note 187, at 45-50.
217. E.g., Stephen, School Desegregation: An Evaluation of Predictions Made in Brown v.
Bd. of Ed., 85 PSYCH. BuLL. 217 (1978); see Report Says Blacks Did Better in Dallas' Segre-
gated Schools, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 5.
218. See Blacks Are Narrowing Education Gap, 10-Year Census Bureau Survey Finds,
Wash. Post, Mar. 7, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 4; cf. Montgomery Report Shows Desegregation of
Schools Working, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 1979, § C, at 3, col. 1 (goal of desegregation is learning
to live with other races, not higher test scores).
219. A recent Harris survey concludes, "[Tihere are wide disparities between whites'
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losses and benefits attributable to segregation and desegregation are
not quantifiable, these benefits and losses are real.
The latent issue in a cost-benefit inquiry is whether the Service
should be involved in fact determinations that are unrelated to
raising revenue. After Green v. Connally and Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, the Service has no choice; whether
the cases are correct is a different question. Because of the over-
whelming importance of the interest concerned, and because it even
may be a constitutional interest, the courts were justified in adopt-
ing a public policy approach. That the Service's primary interest is
raising revenue does not detract from the validity of the public
policy construction. The Code has an effect on every important
financial decision one makes, and a contribution or a tuition pay-
ment to a private segregated school is no less a financial decision
because education also is involved. Contentions that the Service's
concern should only be with purely fiscal matters are unsound be-
cause the federal system of taxation is today a social institution as
well as a fiscal one.220 A corollary to this is that the Service cannot
abdicate its responsibility on the ground that it lacks expertise in
the area of race discrimination. Today, responsible government offi-
cials must be familiar with manifestations of discriminatory con-
duct, regardless of their areas of specialization.
The doctrine of Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner can be
expanded to require the denial of tax exempt status to private segre-
gated schools, and since Runyon v. McCrary was decided, denial to
secular schools is especially appropriate. Runyon and Brown v.
Dade Christian Schools, Inc. suggest that discrimination in all but
a few church-related schools is illegal, and therefore, reliance on
Tank Truck is more appropriate than when the district court de-
cided Green earlier.21 Runyon and Dade Christian alone are not as
perceptions of blacks and blacks' perceptions of themselves . . . .The perception gaps are
all sources of real conflict and tension." Poll Shows Less Bigotry, But Blacks Still Feel Effect,
Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1979, § A, at 2, col. 1, at col. 2. Generally, different perspectives cause
blacks to believe they are discriminated against to a larger extent than whites, while whites
think little discrimination exists today. See also note 214 supra.
220. Consider, for example, the institution of mkrriage. The decision to marry or divorce
also is a financial decision with permanent ramifications attributable to the Code. E.g., I.R.C.
§ 215 (alimony). Or, consider the tax incentive to buy a house, rather than rent one. E.g.,
I.R.C. § 163 (interest deduction). See also note 36 supra.
221. One author noted that the charitable provisions cannot be separated from public
policy because public policy considerations are "inherent in" the provisions. Federal Tax,
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useful as an effective revenue procedure would be, because they
require an injured litigant and a court adjudication for each school.
Careless extension of the public policy approach could create a ple-
thora of administrative and constitutional problems,222 but unlim-
ited extension of Tank Truck is unlikely. Extension of the public
policy rationale to another Code provision would require a compel-
ling state interest, a judicial willingness to expand on Tank Truck,
and an injured party. Lack of an injured party prevents many suits
from being docketed, and when a case is litigated, frequently the
Service takes the place of those who are aggrieved.113
Denial of the use of other favorable Code provisions to taxpayers
who violate various public policies has superficial appeal, but Tank
Truck should be applied conservatively because extensive use of the
Code to punish would entail awesome administrative burdens, and
have other adverse consequences. This is illustrated by the real
problem in Tank Truck: the inadequacy of the fines levied in pre-
venting the violation of the load weight laws. If the fines imposed
by the relevant statutes in that case had been sufficiently severe,
then no advantage would have accrued to intentional violators, re-
gardless of the deductability of the fines. The public policy gloss on
the business expense deduction section is not a panacea, because
to some extent it allows legislatures to escape their responsibilities.
Thus, if a public policy approach were advocated for another Code
section, this might indicate that the direct legislative sanctions were
inadequate. For example, if a chemical company were denied use
of the investment credit2 4 for new equipment because it used the
equipment to pollute in excess of acceptable standards, this would
be a poor substitute for penalties that would make the punishment
for violations too great for the company to take the risk. Ideally,
legislation should seek to prevent anti-social conduct from occur-
ring. A very limited expansion of Tank Truck promotes this end by
supra note 19, at 946 n.125. On the basis of this distinction, the author concluded that Tank
Truck is not controlling and that a public policy approach under the charitable provisions
has an independent vitality. Id.; see note 226 infra.
222. In Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 937-39, the author discusses the analogous problem
of expansion of the state action doctrine to other Code provisions.
223. Even when litigants actually have suffered, their claims are subject to dismissal for
lack of standing. See generally Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 950-58; Tax Benefits, supra
note 19, at 1418-21.
224. I.R.C. § 38.
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keeping public pressure on the appropriate branch-the legislative.
To an extent, this reasoning applies also to section 501(c)(3), but a
public policy approach ultimately can be justified by the impor-
tance of desegregation, 22 and by the section's purpose, which is
the promotion of activities generally considered beneficial. 226
A public policy interpretation of the charitable provisions can be
reversed or modified by legislation. Sentiment for legislation that
will protect private schools exists in Congress, 27 and if a bill is
passed, then the state action question, mooted eight years ago by
Green, may need to be resolved. Bills introduced in Congress are of
three different types. One type of bill would amend the Code to
preclude the Service from denying tax exempt status to a segregated
school, unless a court has found that the school is racially discrimi-
natory.228 Under this type of bill, schools would lose their exemption
only after an independent adjudication, for example, of a Civil
Rights Act claim. This would provide substantial protection for
private schools. Because litigation is much more costly and time-
consuming than administrative proceedings, most schools would
retain their exemptions. Another type of bill would prohibit the
Service from issuing a procedure at all. Some of these proscribe
issuance until 1981;229 others indefinitely suspend the Service's
225. A question beyond the scope of this Article is the implication of the public policy
approach for institutional prejudices in employment against minorities and women. Whether
the Service should distinguish entities, or only charitable entities, on the basis of employment
discrimination involves consideration of the magnitude of society's interest in fair employ-
ment practices; the extent to which remedies and agencies presently are available; and the
administrative burden that would be imposed on the Service. Presumably, the Service will
attempt to monitor in this area only if it is forced to by case law or legislation.
226. The exemption from taxation of money and property devoted to charitable
and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is compen-
sated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the
benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.
H.R. REP. No. 1820, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1939).
227. See notes 4 & 183 supra.
228. Representative Chappell introduced the following bill to amend § 501(c)(3):
[T]he Internal Revenue Service shall not terminate for reasons of racial dis-
crimination the exempt status of any organization listed in this section which
is operated exclusively for educational purposes unless said organization is adju-
dicated as racially discriminatory in a court of the United States or of any
State."
H.R. 96, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
229. The Save Our Schools Act of 1979 was introduced in the Senate by 11 Senators:
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power to promulgate.2"' These bills would not preclude the Service
from independently determining that a school is discriminatory and
denying it tax exempt status, but they would make the fairness and
uniformity of the -Service's determinations more susceptible to pro-
cedural challenge. Neither of these bills is an unequivocal grant of
exemption to private segregated schools, and they could be charac-
terized as temporal or procedural. A court, therefore, might treat
these bills as an insufficient negation of the Service's construction
of section 501(c) (3) to justify a decision on the constitutional ques-
tion.
The third type of proposed legislation would amend section 501
to provide that status as an exempt organization under section
501(c)(3), "[n]otwithstanding any other law or rule of law . . .
shall not be construed as the provision of Federal assistance.""23
Although the purpose of this language is to protect charitable organ-
izations, and private schools in particular, 2 2 from denial of exempt
status on the ground that the entity has violated public policy, these
[D]uring the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and
ending on December 31, 1980, the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate shall
not issue-
(1) in final form the proposed revenue procedure described in subsection (b),
and
(2) in proposed or final form any regulation, revenue procedure, revenue rul-
ing, or other guidelines which set forth rules substantially similar to the rules
set forth in the proposed revenue procedure described in subsection (b).
S. 103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (subsection (b) refers to the first procedure).
230. E.g., H.R. 1009, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Except for their duration, these bills are
substantially identical to those that are effective only until 1981. See note 229 supra.
231. The Charitable Organizations Preservation Act of 1979 provides in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any other law of rule of law- (1) the exemption from taxation under this
subtitle of any organization described in subsection (c)(3), and (2) the allowance of a deduc-
tion for a contribution to an organization described in subection (c)(3), shall not be construed
as the provision of Federal assistance." S. 449, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The House
counterpart is H.R. 1002, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
232. Although the purpose of the bills is to protect private schools, a statement made in
support of the House version reflects a misunderstanding of the public policy approach, which
does not rely on the theory that tax exempt status constitutes federal assistance:
[O]ne of the governing assumptions of the proposed IRS rulings, and central
to this entire controversy (based primarily on the Federal court case of Green
v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (1970)) is that tax exemption, Federal Assis-
tance, and Federal subsidies are one and the same thing. Since the IRS equates
tax exemption with Federal subsidies, it argues that tax exemption may be
denied to private schools and, by logical extension, to other private organiza-
tions, if such organizations do not conform to "public policy" . ...
The IRS and the Tax Exempt Status of Private Schools and Other Charitable Institutions,
125 CONG. REc. E801 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1979) (extension of remarks of Rep. Dornan). Contra,
notes 23 & 97 supra & accompanying text.
NEW REVENUE PROCEDURE
bills alone would not change the status of private segregated
schools. The language of the provisions would have effect if Green
and the Service had relied on state action theory, but because that
case and the Service treat private segregated schools as outside the
meaning of "charitable," the proposed bills would have no force. If
passed, legislation of this type will raise the state action question
only if the Service by other law is effectively precluded from denying
tax exempt status to private segregated schools under the statutory
and public policy approaches.
If one or more of the proposed bills were passed, and if a plaintiff
obtained standing to challenge it, then a court might avoid the
constitutional question. Assuming, however, that one of the three
types of bills-or a bill not yet proposed-is enacted, and a court
overcomes its aversion to constitutional decisions, then the consid-
erations relevant to application of the state action doctrine remain
unchanged from the pre-Green era. The Supreme Court has refused
to expand the state action doctrine,23 but these cases are not dispo-
sitive. Dicta in other Court cases can support a holding that tax
exemptions are state action.24
Elaborate reasoning can lead to conclusions on either side of the
state action problem, but there are two premises on which the rea-
sonable arguments are grounded. First, tax exempt status is a mea-
surable and positive benefit, and second, an unqualified decision
can result in administrative chaos. Thus, a deciding court must
indulge in at least a minor fiction, regardless of its result. To prevent
the Service from being tasked with determining the constitution-
ality of hundreds of private activities in which the public interest
is relatively minor, a holding that tax exemptions are state action
will require the forum to treat differences in form as material. Simi-
233. See cases cited note 54 supra.
234. In Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Court treated county tax
credits for contributions to segregated private schools as equivalent to state action. In Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), a tax exemption was one of several indicia on which the Court
relied to find state action in a situation involving a park, the use of which was restricted to
whites. Neither of these cases is determinative. The tax credit in Griffin was one of two
government aids for segregated schools, and the ordinance authorizing the credit was repealed
before the Court issued its opinion. Evans is not controlling because tax exemption was only
one of several government supports on which the Court may have relied. Moreover, the Court
emphasized the public nature of the park and its history of management by the municipality
as factors influencing its opinion. But see Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F.
Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). See also Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey v. Byrne,
47 U.S.L.W. 2474 (3d Cir. 1979). These cases are commented on at note 64 supra.
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larly, because tax exemptions are critical to many schools' financial
survival, and because substantial decreases in tax revenues are at-
tributable to section 501(c)(3), a holding that exempt status is less
than significant state action will involve at least some departure
from logic. A qualified holding =5 of state action is the most desirable
of the two results. Failure to apply the fifth amendment on the
ground that the scope of the state action doctrine might become too
great is unsupportable; judges know how to limit their opinions, and
the courts have a duty under the due process clause2"7 to prevent
federal support of racially discriminatory institutions .
211
CONCLUSION
The Service's position that allegedly charitable entities should be
denied tax exemption if they are intentionally segregated is valid,
and Bob Jones University v. United States, therefore, should be
reversed. The religion clauses are not absolutes, and because few
minorities would seek admission, desegregation in exchange for the
benefits of exemption is an insignificant impingement on the uni-
versity's free exercise interest.
While pressed between the judicial and legislative branches, the
Service has attempted to fulfill its obligation to enforce the law
without exceeding its administrative mandate. This attempt should
be successful if the revised procedure becomes effective. The revised
procedure is equitable because it incorporates flexible standards
with objective measures of discrimination. Thus, administration of
the guidelines can be sensitive to unusual circumstances and to the
important parental and student interests in education, while the
government also can be saved from the anomolous position of grant-
ing special tax status to schools that violate the Civil Rights Act of
1866.
235. A decision can be limited to purposefully segregated schools with little difficulty. A
court would simply be "drawing lines." See Federal Tax, supra note 19, at 937-39.
236. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
